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The rich nation is the novelty, and the development 
that makes entire nations rich is itself the pivotal 
development of modern history 
(Asa Briggs, British historian, 1963) 
 
Abstract 
Seen in historical perspective the main economic predicaments of the present world (such as poverty, 
inequality, backwardness) appear in a somewhat different light than in many current discussions. The 
achievements of the modern age, and in particular of the post- World War II period, are considered from the 
viewpoint of economic and demographic history, and in their connection with the contemporary systems of 
production and of international relations.  
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1. Introduction 
We live in a very unequal world plagued by poverty. Overall, economic progress is 
perceived as too slow, as the advance of “globalization” renders the inequalities and 
miseries of the world less tolerable than in the past. There is a widespread rejection in some 
quarters (radical economists and political scientists in particular) of the economic 
institutions of the modern world (identified under the garb of “capitalism” and 
“globalization”).1 However, from the perspective of economic history, the present state of 
the world appears in a different light. A rather uncontroversial fact is that never in the 
history of mankind have there been so many paupers as in the present times. But the basic 
reason for this is that never there have been so many people around. Indeed, never in the 
history of the world has the percentage of (absolutely) poor people been so low. Moreover, 
quite recently even the absolute number of world paupers has kept decreasing. Economic 
inequality in the world as a whole has probably never been so high, but the reason is not, as 
sometimes hinted, that the lot of the poorer has worsened (“exploitation”), but the 
dramatic, albeit unequally distributed, economic betterment of the many. At the same time 
the propensity towards economic inequality (as captured by the extraction ratio, defined 
below) has probably never been so low in historical times. The green revolution and 
technological progress have contributed to decisively overcome the Malthusian trap and to 
bring about an impressive demographic explosion. Indeed, never in the history of the 
world has economic and demographic growth been so rapid as after WWII, greatly 
favoured by the absence of major wars, 2 of the sort that were endemic in the past, and by 
the extraordinary expansion of international exchanges. Global overall peace can be 
obviously attributed to the mutual threat of atomic destruction, but also to a change of 
perspective in international relations against the respectability of wars of aggression and 
conquest, leading to a change in the rules of the game that was already attempted, but 
utterly failed, after the first World War. The price to pay has been the lingering of the 
world on the brink of a global nuclear catastrophe, as well as the freezing of frontiers and 
national aspirations (which have surged again with a vengeance after the end of the Cold 
War). But Malthusian traps, and different forces leading to destabilization of relatively 
peaceful world coexistence (such as the inevitable diffusion of nuclear capabilities and the 
rise of nationalism in some quarters) are looming, with the possibility of drawing the post-
war period of overall peaceful economic and demographic growth eventually to a close. 
2. Poverty 
Historically world population has been increasing at a very slow pace, amounting to near 
stagnation, held in check by high mortality rates, especially of child mortality. Per capita 
incomes have been mostly at what we would regard utter poverty levels, and whenever they 
have increased they have done so at a very slow pace, amounting, in the long run, to some 
                                                 
1 For a sympathetic survey of those opinions see Zolo (2007). For a confutation of all sort of widespread anti-
globalization prejudices and conventional opinions see Bhagwati, 2007. For a forceful defence of capitalist 
globalization see Norberg (2003). 
2 This means all-out wars between major military powers. Of course there was no want of “minor” conflicts 
(for a list of them and an estimate of their presumed victims see Balint, 1996), but for relative intensity and 
proportion of victims in the global world population were apparently of much lesser importance than in 
other epochs. 
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small fraction of one percent yearly. Following the industrial revolution things have started 
radically to change. But never have world population and world income increased so 
tumultuously as after the Second World War; indeed, the explosion both in wealth and 
population in this post-war period has been an historical unicum. Scientifically speaking, 
from the perspective of the history of mankind, the anomaly to be explained is not 
backwardness and poverty, but development and wealth. The brakes that in the previous 
epochs constrained the growth of world population, and which started to slacken following 
the Industrial Revolution,3 have apparently been swept away by the progressive lengthening 
in life expectancy, leading to unprecedented demographic growth, which has been 
accompanied by unprecedented economic growth. 
Still, a large part of humanity lives in appalling poverty conditions. Indeed, there has never 
been such a high number of poor people in the world as in the post WWII period. If 
conventionally (very conventionally, indeed) we define, following the World Bank, as 
(absolute) poverty a daily consumption of less that two dollars,4 their number in 2001 was 
estimated as 2.7 billion,5 more than the entire world population in 1950.6 The number of 
extreme poor consuming less than one dollar a day in 2001 was reckoned to have been 
close to 1.1 billion, about the same as the entire world population in 1820 (which may be 
conventionally taken as the year of the coming of age of the Industrial Revolution in the 
UK, and of its spreading outside); the number of the extreme poor in previous years is 
estimated to have been even higher, about 1.5 billion around 1980 (before the recent 
tumultuous growth of the economy of China). Most of them are concentrated in third 
world countries, but a few millions are living in (and a number of them leaving from) 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (the so called transition countries). See the data in the 
following tables:7 
                                                 
3 Or more exactly, following the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that has led 
first to the Industrial Revolution and, subsequently, through the medical and public hygiene innovations it 
was able to conjure, to the Mortality Revolution of the second half of the nineteenth century and later, 
coinciding with the times of what has been dubbed the Second Industrial Revolution (cf. Easterlin, 1996, 
pp. 7-9, 23-29, 69 f.). 
4 Or rather 2.15 dollars a day at 1993 purchasing power (somewhat less than 800 dollars a year), 
corresponding to 2 dollars of 1985 international purchasing power. According to the World Bank definition 
1.08 dollars of 1993 purchasing power a day (somewhat less than 400 dollars a year), corresponding to 1 
dollar at 1985 international purchasing power, characterize extreme poverty. In the text we use the 
colloquially usual distinction of 1 and 2 dollars a day. (For the definition of the international poverty line see 
World Bank, 2005, table 2.5, “Poverty”, http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005/Table2_5.htm#definition; see 
also UNPD, 2007, p. 367). Recently the World Bank has updated its definitions following a revised and 
extended appraisal of PPP exchange rates. We shall deal with these issues in the next section. 
5 Source: Word Bank (2005), table 2.5 “Poverty”, at http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005/Table2_5.htm. 
It should be noted that there has been actually a decrease (estimated at about 400 million) in the number of 
the extreme poor (less than 1$ a day) during the 20 years from 1981 to 2001, but only because of the 
reduction of extreme poverty in China. Some further decrease in the amount of the less extreme poor 
seems to be happening in the more recent years. For some recent discussion on world poverty estimates 
and some updating, see Chen and Ravaillon (2004) and (2007) and Ravaillon, Chen and Sangraula (2007).  
6 See Table 1. We refer to the World Bank data as the most authoritative, even by no means uncontroversial, 
source. The accuracy of World Bank data has been challenged in particular by Bhalla (2002) who estimates a 
significantly lower number of absolute poor and a much faster decrease in poverty in the two decades of 
accelerated globalization, between 1980 and 2000.  
7 The figures are expressed in millions, the data are taken from  World Bank, 2005, table 2.5. 
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Table 1. Number of people living with less than 2$ a day8 
Region 1981 2001 
East Asia & Pacific 1,170 864 
of which China 876 594 
Europe & Central Asia9 20 93 (113 in 
1999) 
Latin America & Caribbean  99 128 
Middle East & North Africa 52 70 
South Asia 821 1,064 
Sub-Saharan Africa 288 516 
Total 2450 2735 
Excluding China 1,574 2,142 
 
Table 2. Number of people living with less than  1$ a day10 
Region 1981 2001 
East Asia & Pacific 796 271 
 China 634 212 
Europe & Central Asia 3 17(30 in 
1999) 
Latin America & Caribbean 36 50 
Middle East & North Africa 9 7 
South Asia 475 431 
Sub-Saharan Africa 164 313 
Total 1,482 1,089 
Excluding China 848 877 
2.1 Poverty and transition 
It is notable that the number of the poor in transition countries as a whole has reached a 
peak in 1999, just a visible sign of the hardship engendered by the transition process during 
the nineties, but since then it has started to decrease. The same applies to the percentage of 
the poor in the population in transition countries, increasing, according to World Bank 
data, from 0.4 in 1987 to a peak of 6.3 in 1999, decreasing to 3.6 in 2001 (for those living 
with less than 1$ a day); increasing from 3.3 in 1987 to a peak of 23.8 in 1999, decreasing to 
19.7 in 2001 (for those living with less than 2$ a day). 
                                                 
8 Source: Word Bank (2005), table 2.5 “Poverty”, at http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005/Table2_5.htm. 
For revised and updated data see World Bank, December 2008, table 2, p. 11. 
9 The data refer to Europe and Central Asia, but the poor in the area are essentially concentrated in the 
transition countries of Eastern Europe (including South-Eastern Europe) and of the former Soviet Union. 
10 Source: ibidem. 
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Table 3. Percentage of the poor in Eastern Europe (in 2002)11 
 Below1$ 
a day 
Below 
2$ a day 
Albania <2 11.8 
Belarus <2 <2 
Bosnia nd nd 
Bulgaria 4.7 16.2 
Croatia <2 <2 
Cz. Rep. <2 <2 
Estonia <2 5.2 
Hungary <2 <2 
Latvia <2 8.3 
Lithuania <2 6.9 
Macedonia <2 4 
Moldova 22 63.7 
Poland <2 <2 
Romania <2 14 
Russia <2 7.5 
Ser. Mon. nd nd 
Slovenia <2 <2 
Slovakia <2 2.9 
Ukraine 2.9 45.7 
 
2.3 The world poor as a percentage 
But on the whole the share of the poor in the human population has never been so low. 
According to the historical estimates reported in Bourguignon and Morrison (2002, pp. 
731-732), and taking into account the number of conventional poor people in 2001, 
estimated by the World Bank, as well as the estimate of the size of world population in 
2001, reported in table 4, the share of world population living in poverty diminishes from 
94,4% in 1820 to 44% in 2001, that of those living in extreme poverty from 83,9 in 1820 
down to 18% in 2001. In the end, taking into account the fact that in the period the share 
of the poor has been greatly reduced, the fundamental explanation of why there are so 
many poor people in the world is that there are so many people around. Indeed, human 
population has increased steadily and dramatically in the last two centuries, and in 
particular in the last few decades. Some relevant data are reported in table 4. 
                                                 
11 Source: as in table 1. 
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Table 412 Human population in the course of history (in millions) 13 
8000 BC 5  
1000 BC 50  
500 BC 100  
1 AD 231  
1000  268  
1500 438  
1600 556  
1700 603  
1750  790  
1800 980  
1820 1,041 
1870 1,271 
1913 1,791  
1950 2,535  
1960 3,032  
1970 3,699  
1980 4,451  
1990 5,295 
1995 5,719  
2001 6,148 
2005 6, 515  
2008 6,641, the 1/1/2008, as projected according to the World population clock 
To grasp the extent of the dramatic acceleration of population growth in recent times one 
may notice that the increase in population in the ten years between 1995 and 2005 (796 
million) is more or less the same as that in the 10,000 years or so from the start of the 
agricultural revolution to the dawn of the industrial revolution (for which we may 
conventionally the take the year 1750). 
                                                 
12 The sources of the data are as follows: 8000 BC, Haub, 1995, p. 5, quoted in US Census Bureau (2007a); 
1000 and 500 BC, McEvedy and Jones, 1978, pp. 342-351, quoted in US Census Bureau (2007a); 1-1700 
and 1820-1913, Maddison (2006), p. 636; 1750 and 1800, United Nations, 1999; 1950-2005, United Nations, 
2006, with the exception of 2001, taken from US Census Bureau 2007b. The data from 1800 in Europe, and 
from 1900 in the other continents are regarded, by and large, to have a fair degree of reliability. The data 
concerning the previous years are just estimates or, even, more or less, wild guesses. They should be 
considered to give an order of magnitude, rather than provide reliable data with any degree of precision (on 
this see Caldwell and Schindlmayr, 2002). Indeed, this applies even more to the estimates concerning 
national income in the tables that follow.  
13 Looking at the first lines of the table, comparing them with the last ones, one is forced to come to terms 
with the fact that the momentous historical events of our distant past, recollected and magnified in history 
books, involved such comparatively insignificant numbers of people.  
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2.4 The evaluation of poverty 
Of course this depends crucially on the definition of the poor. Here we use the World 
Bank definition, whereby the poor are defined in terms of absolute purchasing power, 
establishing “a realistic lower bound for the minimum … level of consumption to meet 
basic human needs” (World Bank, December 2008, p. 2). This may not well correspond to 
a subjective, socially and environmentally conditioned, definition of poverty, in the sense of 
deprivation (see on this point, in particular, Kenny, 2006). Subjective deprivation may be a 
function of achieved living standards, and increasing expectations (cf. Easterlin, 1996, pp. 
131-144). Relative poverty depends on distribution. Then there is subjective poverty that 
depends on habits and aspirations, where the latter increase with the diffusion, facilitated 
by the means of mass communication, of the consumption models of the better off. We 
shall be concerned only cursory with these issues. All this is perfectly true, but without a 
common measure one could hardly make intertemporal comparisons. Of course, in making 
the latter one should ideally go into detail as to the specific relevant circumstances of the 
various cases (possibly extending the narrative to the whole range of Sen’s capabilities). 
Here we may be content to note that the trends in average incomes are corroborated by 
comparable trends in life statistics (see below). 
How are the poverty benchmarks of the World Bank at 1$ a day and 2$ a day set? Basically 
the first refers to average national poverty level of a set of the poorest countries of the 
world, and the second to the average national poverty level of the developing countries as a 
whole. Recently there has been a reevaluation of the dimension of world poverty by the 
World Bank, following a new expanded data base of household income and expenditure 
surveys, and a new comprehensive assessment of the PPP exchange rates. As a result the 
previous PPPs have been increased in a number of poor countries because their internal 
price level has been seen as higher than previously understood. A reason advanced is that 
the lower quality of goods consumed by the poor in poorer countries was not sufficiently 
accounted for.14 A new extreme poverty benchmark level has been set at 1.25 US$ at 2005 
purchasing power, and the new poverty level at 2 US$ at 2005 purchasing power. 
According to the new estimates extreme poverty is more widespread than according to the 
old. The amount of people living in extreme poverty is estimated at 1.4 billion people, and 
that of those living in poverty at 2.5 billion. The percentage of the world population living 
in poverty has been revalued at 47%, and of those living in extreme poverty at 25%. 
However the dynamic aspect of world poverty has remained more or less the same, since 
“over 15 years global poverty fell by an average of 1 percentage point a year” (World Bank, 
2008, p.1). Moreover “Global poverty measured at the $1.25 a day line has been decreasing 
since the 1980s. The number of people living in extreme poverty fell from 1.9 billion in 
1981 to 1.8 billion in 1990 to about 1.4 billion in 2005” (ibidem, p. 10). At the same time 
“the poverty rate for all developing countries measured at [the median poverty rate of 2 
PPP$ 2005] fell from nearly 70 percent in 1981 to 47 percent in 2005, but the number of 
people living on less than $2.00 a day has remained nearly constant at 2.5 billion” (ibidem), 
less than the 2.7 billion estimated in 2001 according to the old criteria. This obviously is the 
consequence of the fact that the purchasing power of 2$ in 2005 is markedly less than that 
of 2$ in 1985. The criteria used for defining extreme poverty according to the new 
benchmarks are still the same as before—“the poverty line typical of the poorest countries 
of the world” establishing “a realistic lower bound for the minimum… level of 
                                                 
14 Cf. World Bank, 2008, pp. 3,8. 
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consumption to meet basic human needs” (ibidem, pp. 1-2). In particular, “the new extreme 
poverty line is set at $1.25 a day in 2005 PPP terms, which represents the mean of the 
poverty lines found in the poorest 15 countries ranked by per capita consumption” 
(ibidem, p. 22). In turn $2 a day in 2005 PPP terms represents the median poverty line for 
the developing countries of the world (ibidem, p. 10). In the present text we do not take 
advantage of the new evaluations, because they represent a rupture in relation the previous 
historical data set that reduces historical comparability (“as a result of revisions in PPP 
exchange rates, poverty rates for individual countries cannot be compared with poverty 
rates reported in earlier editions” of World Development Indicators (ibidem, p. 22)). Our focus is 
on history and dynamic change in the very long run, for which the old estimates are more 
suitable, pending a recalculation of older data using the new methodology.15 
3. An unequal world 
While a considerable share of the world population still lives in poverty, world income and 
wealth are very unequally distributed. A recent research by Wider, the ONU economic 
research centre on poverty and development16 (Davis et alii, 2006a), shows the extent of 
world inequality in the distribution of personal wealth: 17  
The 24 richer OECD countries own 83% of world private wealth (64% at PPP$) with only 
15% of world population and a per capita wealth of $116,000 (114,000 at PPP$). The 64 
poorest countries with 40% of world population own 2% of world personal wealth (8% at 
PPP$), with a per capita wealth of 1000$ (5000 at PPP$)18 
In 2000 the 1% richest adults owned the 40% of overall private wealth (32% in  PPP$ 
terms)19; the richest 10%, 85%; the poorest 50%, 1% (4% in PPP$ terms).20 
The Gini index of inequality of overall world wealth distribution (calculated using current 
exchange rates) is given as 89 (80 in PPP$ terms)21, the same as that of a group of 10, 
where 1 has 1000, and 9, 1 each.22 
                                                 
15 This is particular relevant for connecting to the historical estimates in Bourguignon and Morrison (2002), 
reported in table 5. 
16 World Institute for Development Economics Research: http://www.wider.unu.edu. 
17 Where personal wealth is defined as “the value of physical and financial assets less liabilities” (Davies et alii, 
2006a, p. 1). The data refer to the year 2000. Methodology: “average wealth level: based on household 
balance sheets and wealth survey data for 38 countries (56% of the world population and 80% of wealth) 
extended by regression methods to most other countries region--income class averages imputed to 
remaining countries…distribution of wealth: based on distribution data for 20 countries wealth 
concentration estimated from income distribution for most other countries region--income class averages 
imputed to remaining countries” (Davies et alii, 2006b). The data considered refer to the year 2000, and are 
either measured in dollar terms at the current exchange rates or in Purchasing Power Parity dollars. It must 
be noted that passing from current dollars to PPP$ reduces somewhat world inequality, since the dollar 
purchasing power is usually higher in poorer countries, but it does not alter substantially the global picture. 
It should be noted that an inquiry such as the one referred to above is based on limited data and fraught 
with methodological difficulties; therefore one should stress that, as is always the case with statistics, but 
even more in the present instance, the data should be considered to give some order of magnitude rather 
than to be taken at face value. For a detailed explanation of the methods used in the inquiry one may refer 
to the source. 
18 Ibidem, Table 8. 
19 “37% reside in the US, 27% in Japan” (Davies et alii, 2006b). 
20 Davies et alii, 2006a, Table 10, and Table 11a. 
21 Ibidem, Table 12.. 
22 Davies et alii, 2006b, p. 9. 
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Income is distributed less unequally than wealth, but still in a markedly unequal way. 
According to most estimates, reported in Milanovic (2006, p. 8), the Gini coefficient of 
world income distribution is around 65% in the contemporary world.23 To make a 
comparison, the Gini index of the distribution of family incomes of Italy is reported as 36, 
that of the USA 45, that of Sweden 25. 24 The state where the Gini index appears to be 
highest, among those reported in CIA’s World Factbook, 2007 is Namibia with 71, but 
probably only because in other, even more unequal, third world countries no statistical data 
allowing its calculation are available. 25 
Table 5. Poverty and income distribution in recent world history26 
year Gini coefficient of world income distribution
Percentage of the population living in 
Poverty 
Percentage of the population living in extreme poverty 
1820 0.500 94.4 83.9 
1850 0.532 92.5 81.5 
1870 0.560 89.6 75.4 
1890 0.588 85.7 71.7 
1910 0.610 82.4 65.6 
1929 0.616 75.9 56.3 
1950 0.640 71.9 54.8 
1960 0.635 64.3 44 
1970 0.650 60.1 35.6 
1980 0.657 55 31.5 
1992 0.657 51.3 23.7 
2001 0.657 
(0.699) 
44 18 
3.1 Inequality between nations and inequality inside nations 
From the historical viewpoint it appears that in the past (before the “great divergence”27) 
income differences inside nations were relatively more relevant than nowadays in the 
determination of global inequality. In the pre-industrial world more than half of global 
income inequality could have been due to inequality in income distribution inside nations, 
while today the prevailing component, about 70%, is deemed to be due to differences in 
average per-capita incomes between nations (Milanovic, 2006, p. 9). On the other hand in 
more recent times the weight of the inside nations component seems to have somewhat 
increased but the trend is not uniform in the different regions of the world.28 The greater 
                                                 
23 The paper by Milanovic contains an interesting critical review of the different methodological approaches 
used to get those values. 
24 The Gini coefficients above are taken from CIA (2007). 
25 Such as in particular in Equatorial Guinea that, according to CIA (2007), has the “fourth highest per capita 
income in the world” but where the great bulk of the population allegedly lives in desperate conditions with 
less than a dollar a day (cf. also “Playboy waits for his African throne “, Sunday Times, 3/9/2006, available at: 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article626511.ece). 
26 Data taken from Bourguignon and Morrison (2002, p. 731); the data of the last row are calculated from 
population data in table 4 and Word Bank poverty data. The Gini coefficient in the last row is calculated by 
Milanovic (December 2007) from 2002 Word Income Distribution Database. The figure between brackets 
refers to the recently revised set of PPP$ exchange rates (ibidem). 
27 Cf. Pomeranz, 2000. 
28 Cf. Nel, 2006, p. 697I; IMF, 2007a, pp. 138 f. 
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growth rate of less developed countries as a whole should be a factor leading to the 
reduction of the between nations component, while increased inequality inside developed 
countries is a factor contributing to the increased inside world inequality component. 
According to the data reported in Bourguignon and Morrison (2002, p. 731) there has been 
an increase through time in the world Gini coefficient, from 50 in 1820 up to the present 
values (see table 5). Values for so far away periods seem to be rather speculative estimates, 
even more daring than the speculative estimates needed to arrive at an aggregate measure 
for the contemporary world as a whole.29 But it seems plausible that the differences in 
income should have been lower in the past, owing to the fact that the great bulk of the 
population was living close to subsistence level, and given the low overall average per 
capita incomes. In a quite recent paper Milanovic (2009) revises the estimates of 
Burguignon and Morrison, arriving at some interesting quantitative conclusions. The global 
Gini coefficient for 1820 is reduced to 43. The Gini coefficient measuring inequality 
between nations (where individual incomes inside any given nation are taken as equal to the 
average value) raises from 15 to 32 between 1820 and 1870, increasing up to 55-60 in the 
after WWII period, showing some reduction in the last twenty years due to the economic 
progress of China and India in particular. Between 1820 and the present times, the between 
countries component of the global world inequality index raises from 35 to 80-85 percent.  
4. What is the source of the present high inequalities and what can we do about it 
4.1 Poverty, inequality, maximum potential inequality, and the extraction rate 
According to table 5, while world inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, has 
steadily increased since 1820 (an increase of the coefficient between 31% and 40% in Table 
5, according to the two different estimates of the 2001 value), the proportion of paupers in 
the world has steadily decreased. But the changes in the world Gini coefficient are of a 
different order of magnitude as compared to the dramatic increase in per capita incomes.  
Under very primitive conditions, when per capita incomes are close to the subsistence 
level, the amount of surplus the economy produces is limited, and this limits the percentage 
of National Income that can be appropriated by the elite, and thus the level of the 
maximum inequality measure (such as Gini coefficient or Theil index) that can be possibly 
achieved, assuming an elite dimensionally nought in relation to the whole population. As 
per capita levels increase, this leads to an increase in the percentage of the national product 
that can be accounted for as surplus, and to an increase in the maximum achievable 
inequality, as measured, say, by the maximum Gini coefficient compatible with the 
maintenance of the mass of the population at the physical subsistence level, and thus with 
the minimal condition assuring persistence in time of the given society.30 Thus we may 
                                                 
29 And indeed the methodological approach of the two authors appears to be particularly rough. See on this 
regard Milanovic, 2009, pp. 2-3; Baten et alii, 2009. On the other hand the results of the latter study, 
pursued through an alternative, but also rough, methodological approach confirm on the whole 
Bourguignon and Morrison’s results. 
30 This assumes that the population is given. But the population itself can be seen as a function of the overall 
income that is allocated to supplying subsistences. If we consider the issue of surplus maximization, and 
that, in a Malthusian perspective, in the long run the size of population depends on the allocation of 
subsistencies, there is an optimal amount of population from the viewpoint of surplus maximization, which 
depends on resources and technology. Whenever decreasing returns set in there are two conflicting effects 
of population increase on the size of surplus: 1. by any given per capita surplus, more people bring about 
more total extractable surplus; 2. but more people decrease per capita surplus produced. If the relationship 
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consider as a true measure of the extent of inequality achieved by a given society not the 
inequality index (such as Gini coefficient) per se, but the percentage achieved of the 
maximum inequality index compatible with a given per capita income level. According to 
Milanovic (2009) and Milanovic et alii (2007) definition, this is called the inequality 
extraction ratio (ier). With the increase in world per capita income following the industrial 
revolution the maximum possible inequality index, which can be measured either in terms 
of Gini coefficient or of Theil index, obviously progressively increases, progressively 
approaching, in case of Gini, the 99 mark. According to Milanovic (2009, p. 18) the 
maximum possible world Gini coefficient increases from 56 in 1820 to 95 in 2005. As we 
have seen from the Bourguignon-Morrison (henceforward BM) data the actual world Gini 
coefficient has increased, but at lower rate. Taking the data of table 5 this means that the 
inequality extraction ratio decreases from 50/56=89 in 1820 to 66/95=70 or 70/95=74 in 
2005. However, Milanovic (2009) estimates the Gini coefficient in 1820 to the lower level 
of 43, and this leads to a much lower reduction in the extraction ratio between 1820 and 
2005, from 43/56=77 to 74 or 70. In terms of Theil index, however, the reduction in ier is 
much more relevant, halving from 70 in 1820 to 35 in 2005 (p. 18). Even the almost 
invariant Gini extraction rates however hide quite a deep change: while the inequality 
extraction rate inside nations has on average strongly decreased, the between nations 
component of inequality, and of the inequality extraction rate, had markedly increased. We 
may arrive therefore at the conclusion, on the basis of the degree of the decrease of 
inequality extraction rate inside nations, that on the whole the propensity to inequality has 
very much decreased, and the responsibility for the increased inequality between 1820 and 
present times depends entirely on the “great divergence”, the dramatic increase in the well 
being of the economically more advanced countries. The overall trend towards the decrease 
of inequality (and of the extraction ratio) inside nations could have been a consequence of 
the changed nature of political and economic institutions, and of greater economic and 
social complexity, both a cause and a consequence of modern economic growth. To some 
extent the extent of inequality may be a consequence of the rules of economic organization 
(the economic system) that allow the attainment of the given production level (as argued, 
with some exaggeration, by Marx, 1875: “any distribution whatever of the means of 
consumption is only a consequence of the distribution of the conditions of production 
themselves. The latter distribution, however, is a feature of the mode of production itself”). 
Thus it is conceivable that under real circumstances inequality could not be reduced below 
some level (such as measured by the Gini coefficient) without bringing about a reduction 
of income produced, and of its growth.31 At the same time too much inequality can have a 
negative impact on income and growth.32 One could then modify the concept of extraction 
                                                                                                                                               
is perceived, it can affect, in theory at least, the extraction and population policy of the elite: under pre-
industrial circumstances more extraction can bring about a population reduction, less extraction an increase. 
31 “An artificially compressed distribution of income differs from the optimal distribution based on 
differences in talent, merit, and effort, and for this reason inhibits growth by affecting incentives, labour 
shirking, and free-riding behaviour” (Cornia, 2004, p. 9), where the implied optimality presumably refers to 
the objective of fostering growth, and perhaps to some implied social welfare function. 
32 Cf. Milanovic et al. (2007, pp. 29-30): “More political power and patronage implies more inequality. The 
frequent claim that inequality promotes accumulation and growth does not get much support from history. 
On the contrary, great economic inequality has always been correlated with extreme concentration of 
political power, and that power has always been used to widen the income gaps through rent-seeking and 
rent-keeping, forces that demonstrably retard economic growth.” For the relationship of inequality and 
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rate as referring to the additional inequality above the minimum level compatible with the 
attainment of the given per capita income. Operationally we could, for instance, take the 
minimum level of inequality in comparable economies having similar levels of per capita 
income as a lower bound to the minimum amount of inequality compatible with the 
sustainable production of the given per capita income., and as an upper bound the 
maximum level of inequality in comparable economies having similar levels of per capita 
income. The extraction rate would than refer to the proportion of the difference between 
the two, concretely attained by an individual economy. The above viewpoint could anyway 
strengthen the conclusion that overall the rate of surplus extraction (above the minimum 
subsistence level) is lower nowadays than in the past, since a part of existing inequality 
could be seen as a necessary consequence of running a highly productive complex 
economic system, much more complex and productive than in the agricultural past. 
Obviously one thing is inequality of incomes, another inequality of welfare. The latter is a 
very elusive concept, but it is what really matters. The first is at best a proxy. In considering 
how does income inequality translate into inequality in welfare it seems reasonable to 
assume decreasing utility of income, appraised for instance through “extended sympathy” 
(putting oneself in somebody else’s shoes).33 And this too could strengthen the conclusion 
that overall the rate of surplus extraction (this time in welfare terms) has become lower.34 
In the end, seen in an historical context, the extent of present inequality appears not to 
depend on the paupers of the world being worse off, since an increasing proportion of 
them are progressively lifted from a state of absolute poverty, but on the fact that on the 
whole the lot of humans has dramatically, albeit quite unequally, improved.35 
4.2 Demographic explosion, economic growth and medical progress 
As a consequence of the unprecedented economic progress and of the diffusion of medical 
and hygiene innovations from the West to the Rest of the world, the rate of growth of 
world population has never been so high as after WWII (see Table 6). Among the regions 
of the world the highest demographic growth rate has been that of Africa, the poorest 
region with the least economic growth.36 From this it is immediately evident that the 
strongest factor explaining the demographic explosion is the diffusion of medical 
                                                                                                                                               
growth, and the hypothesis that could be u-shaped (too little as well as too much inequality being adversary 
to growth) see Cornia et al. (2004). 
33 Moreover other considerations should be to the point: the value attributed to economic success, the life 
standards needed for some professionals to "function" as such, the structure of political power, the rule of 
law, and personal dangers as related to status. 
34 See Milanovic et alii (2007). An instance of a recent reverse trend signalling an increase in the rate of 
surplus extraction could have been the steep increase of chief executives compensations in some advanced 
economies, which may amount to a sort of surplus extraction engineered by collusive behaviour.  
35 As Milanovic (2004, p. 24) puts it: “Average income levels also set an upper boundary on inequality. … As 
societies develop, income inequality has the ‘space’ to grow simply because there is a surplus which can be 
appropriated or redistributed among members of the society.” 
36 The extreme poverty rate of less than 1$ a day in Sub-Saharan Africa is reported as 41% in IMF, October 
2007b, p. 20. On the whole the post-independence economic performance of African countries (with some 
exceptions, notably Botswana) has been dismal: “on average, over the period 1960–2000 Africa’s 
population-weighted per capita annual growth of gross domestic product (GDP) was a mere 0.1%” (Collier, 
2007a, p. 16763). But African economic performance has much improved since the late nineties (cf. IMF, 
2007a pp. 9, f.; IMF, 2007b); in Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, per capita growth was running, before the 
recent economic crisis, at about 3% a year, not a bad performance considering the very high population 
growth rate (World Bank, 2007, p. 3). 
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innovations rather than economic growth per se (which at some stage leads to reduction of 
natality).37 The population explosion, together with the composite ethnic structure of the 
artificial political divisions left over from colonial times, replicated in the post-colonial state 
boundaries,38 and the low educational attainments, contribute to explain the tensions and 
bloody conflicts that have engulfed that unfortunate continent.39 
4.3 What can be done 
As to the concretely implementable measures for bringing about a more equal distribution, 
and reducing poverty, without affecting the unique engine of growth and welfare that has 
been running in the last sixty years or so of world history, there is no much clarity of 
thought. As is often the case, what appears at first sight, is not what really is, if one looks 
rationally at the implications.  
4.3.1 Globalization, poverty and distribution 
For instance the various proposals for limiting the extent of the liberalization of the world 
market, such as advocated by the various anti-WTO and trade-unions inspired movements, 
would probably hamper a main source of growth and economic improvement of the 
enterprising poor.40 Indeed, it appears that for reducing the plight of the poor more 
globalization is needed, not less.41 Globalization improves the welfare of the worse off 
essentially because it is conducive to greater growth42 that spills over to the very poor.43 
However not necessarily globalization and growth, considering also the impact of technical 
                                                 
37 The impact of economic growth on the Mortality Revolution, and hence on demographic growth (before 
fertility controls step in) is downplayed by Easterlin (1996, pp. 69-93). 
38 This does not mean that “natural” ethnical state boundaries would have existed anyway, given the 
patchwork distribution of ethnicities in the African continent. At any rate the complex ethnical structure of 
many African states appears to be an obstacle to development (cf. Easterly and Levine, 1997). The great 
success story in Africa, that of Botswana, may not be unrelated to the relatively great (for African standards) 
ethnic homogeneity of that country (ibidem, p. 1218). 
39 For a recent in-depth assessment of Africa’s economic predicaments see Collier, 2007a, and more amply, 
Collier 2007b. 
40 For the negative overall impact of protectionism on growth, see the quantitative inquiry in Milanovic 
(2005). Cf. also IMF (2007a, p. 157) for the favourable impact of international trade on the relative position 
of the lower quintiles. 
41 For data on trade and financial globalization accompanying the high growth performance of developing 
economies in more recent times, especially since the nineties, see IMF (2007a, pp. 135-139). Trade 
globalization can be measured in terms of the increasing ratio of imports and exports to GNP, financial 
globalization as cross-border assets and liabilities as a ratio to GDP. Of course globalization is more than 
that, and includes globalization in technical knowledge, information, travel and contacts across countries, 
regions and continents. Technical progress in communications and transportation, together with 
international trade and financial liberalization, have much contributed to all aspects of globalization.  
42 On the role of international trade and openness in conjuring development and economic progress see 
Dollar and Kray (2004) and the literature referred there. For a contrary, if rather unbalanced, view, see 
Milanovic (2003).  
43 “Evidence suggests that better growth is translating into declining poverty levels… for a sample of 19 low 
income countries, 1 percent of GDP growth was associated with a 1.3 percent fall in the rate of extreme 
poverty and a 0.9 percent fall in the $2-a-day poverty rate” (World Bank, 2007, p. 3). “Across all regions, 
the evidence therefore suggests that in an absolute sense the poor are no worse off (except in a few post-
crisis economies), and in most cases significantly better off, during the most recent phase of globalization“ 
“over the past two decades, income growth has been positive for all quintiles in virtually all regions and all 
income groups” (IMF, October 2007a, p. 141). 
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progress, lead to an improvement of the worse off in relative terms44 and inequality 
increases could contribute to offset the positive impact on welfare of the increases in real 
incomes.45 As to the trend in income distribution, apparently the main culprit of recent 
increases in economic inequality in some areas of the planet seems to have been 
technological progress, by demanding skills and qualifications and substituting less skilled 
labour.46 On the other hand economic “globalization” (in the sense of increase of trade and 
financial flows,47 with the first having an overall equalizing, the second a disequalizing 
effect) appears to have had a different impact in the different areas of the world. According 
to IMF (2007a) economic globalization is seen to increase inequality somewhat in 
developed countries (because of the prevailing impact of financial liberalization, while trade 
liberalization is seen to exert an equalizing impact anyway48) and decrease inequality in the 
less developed ones (because of the prevailing impact of trade liberalization).49 At the same 
time the diffusion of technological advances all over the world is obviously itself a 
manifestation of “globalization” and could hardly be isolated from the other intervening 
factors (such as for instance financial liberalization, since foreign direct investment in 
particular constitutes an essential vehicle for international technological transfers).  
4.3.2 Aid and transfers 
As to transfers, it is hardly possible that transfers of the size needed to really bring about a 
significant reduction of world inequality in per capita income and wealth could be 
acceptable to the public opinions of better off countries;50 in general, the propensity to aid 
the poor of the world is quite widespread, especially in the “development buzz … 
generated by rock stars, celebrities and NGOs”51, but with somebody else’s money and 
resources. 52 As a prominent example we can mention the movement for international debt 
                                                 
44 Whether globalization leads to a reduction or to an increase in inequality is a contentious issue. See on this 
point Milanovic (2006) and the literature quoted by him. 
45 Milanovic, 2006, p. 13: “the process of globalization by itself changes the perception of one’s position, and 
even if globalization may raise everybody’s real income, it could exacerbate, rather than moderate, feelings 
of despondency and deprivation among the poor.” This could contribute to create the motivation for 
migrating towards more affluent countries, while increasing incomes can supply the resources for meeting 
the costs of migration, often a costly business in relation to the scant resources of the poorest of the earth. 
(On the effect that raising incomes in poorer countries such as India and China can have on increasing the 
emigration push towards richer ones see Bhagwati, 2007, p. 210.) 
46 Cf. IMF (2007a, pp. 139-141). 
47 This corresponds to the World Bank’s narrow definition of globalization as the “freedom and ability of 
individuals and firms to initiate voluntary economic transactions with residents of other countries" (cf. 
Milanovic, 2002, p. 3). 
48 This appears to be contrary to what is implied by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, but it may be explained 
by the reduction in the price of basic wage goods imported from developing countries, in particular, and by 
the reduction in the relative importance of worse paid manufacturing jobs (. IMF (2007a, pp. 155-156). As 
to the impact of financial liberalization in increasing inequalities both in developed and in underdeveloped 
countries this is attributed to the fact that “higher FDI inflows have increased the demand for skilled labor, 
whereas outward FDI in advanced economies has reduced the demand for relatively lower-skilled workers 
in these countries” (ibidem, p. 159). 
49 Cf. IMF, 2007a, ch. 4, pp. 135-170.  
50 The schemes that have been proposed in regard, reviewed by Milanovic (November 2007), seem utterly 
unrealistic. 
51 Collier, 2007b, p.4. 
52 As a prominent historical representative of the “somebody else’s money handouts” school we may mention 
Jeffrey Sachs. After all it is very easy for a practicing development economist to become popular with one’s 
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relief, where the proponents do not appreciate that the only radical way to suppress debt is 
to suppress credit, while insolvency makes international debt more risky, and therefore 
more onerous, and this is not necessarily in the interest of poorer countries.53 None of the 
vocal members of the debt remission campaign seems to have started an international 
voluntary subscription for paying off poorer countries’ debt by reimbursing the creditors, 
or advocating that government create an international special fund for the same purpose 
with taxpayers’ money, in order to eliminate, or reduce, the debt without worsening the 
credit rating of poorer debtors.54 Nevertheless the worsening of credit rating, and the 
consequent reduction in the capability to borrow, of poorer debtors could have some 
positive side.55 Often the debt problem arises from the propensity of populist and/or 
corrupt governments to overborrow for financing consumption expenditures (the onus and 
unpopularity of servicing the debt will then fall on future governments), or the outright 
siphoning out of hard currency into the foreign bank accounts of the leaders. But a 
worsening of credit rating could also jeopardize the ability to borrow in an emergency or an 
economic downturn or for financing productive investment projects. An obvious fact that 
is overlooked by the debt remission campaign is that whenever the funds that have been 
borrowed are not repaid less is available for lending to other borrowers in need, and this is 
especially obvious with the International Financial Institutions.56  
None of the many who deem just and natural that the pharmaceutical industry renounce 
exploiting the intellectual property of anti-Aids drugs, meritoriously discovered at the cost 
of huge investments, has proposed to start a subscription, or to pressurize governments for 
purchasing the corresponding patents at market value, in order to make them free for 
mankind, and in particular for the poorest and most affected by the disease section of 
world population, such as in Africa.57 An alternative, more practical, way to overcome the 
issue of the excessive cost of patented drugs would be for poorer countries not to adhere 
to the international conventions protecting intellectual property rights, but this would put 
them outside the WTO, since TRIPS (Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights) has become a part of WTO agreements.58 As a matter of fact 
                                                                                                                                               
charges by generously advocating the pledging of somebody else’s money. For a comprehensive criticism of 
past experience of aid and its bureaucratic implementation see Easterly (2006). For a hefty criticism of 
Easterly’s standpoint, and Easterly’s reply, see Sachs (2006) and Easterly (n.d). 
53 For the ambiguous aspects of debt relief, in particular that affecting the International Financial Institutions, 
see Easterly (2006), pp. 230-236. 
54 On the other hand the creation of such a special fund would bring about an obvious moral hazard 
problem. 
55 On this see Stiglitz, 2007, pp. 216 f. 
56 Cf. Stiglitz, 2007, p. 228:“Today, the developing countries that have repaid what was owed … worry that 
debt relief is commandeering money that might otherwise have been available to them”. 
57 Some feasible projects of financing private or public medical research of specific relevance for poorer 
countries, and insufficiently financially rewarding for unfounded private medical research, with suitable 
contracts allowing poorer countries taking advantage through free access of the innovations thus produced, 
have been proposed. This kind of schemes would have the advantage of helping poorer countries with aid 
expenditures bypassing corrupt and inefficient governments, helping, at the same time, the production of 
public goods useful for the whole of mankind. In general aid expenditure resulting in the creation of public 
goods that are of particular interest for poorer countries (for instance producing information or educational 
material) could by-pass their government and administrations and remedy at the same time the 
inefficiencies deriving from the insufficient provision of public goods. 
58 See the entry TRIPS in Wikipedia, and the sources listed there. [References from Wikipedia are usually 
shunned because of the way mistaken and inexactitudes can be incorporated (but also corrected) by 
everybody concerned. But a basic principle of Wikipedia is that all information should be supported by 
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underdeveloped countries have little to gain and much to lose from the degree of 
protection of intellectual property rights contemplated by TRIPS. Even if they do not 
comply, still a large market (that of developed countries), where intellectual rights are 
protected, and innovation is financed by market proceeds, would remain.59 With the Doha 
Declaration (adopted in Doha, in November 2001 by the WTO Ministerial Conference) the 
extent of TRIPS has been attenuated, and some further development in this direction could 
be contemplated in future WTO negotiations.60 In theory a possible way to reconcile the 
objective of maintaining revenues and incentives for intellectual production with that of 
helping the less developed countries could be to transfer part of development aid 
expenditures to national producers of intellectual public goods (preferably through some 
general measures such as tax rebates), while allowing to the underdeveloped economies (or 
some subset of them such as the poorest ones) their free utilization. The downside is that 
lack of protection for intellectual goods could dampen their production in the 
underdeveloped countries themselves; at a certain stage of their development even less 
developed countries may decide that protection is worth the while. In practice it is hard to 
expect that developed countries, and especially the USA, could allow an attenuation of the 
protection of intellectual goods, owing to the intensity of the lobbying by the industries 
concerned. Indeed, the latter have already succeeded to extend the protection to much 
higher levels than what appears reasonable and economically justifiable.61 
As far as aid in general is concerned there is the issue of the lasting effects of the culture of 
dependency in perpetuating the poverty trap, by facilitating the survival of corrupt and 
inefficient governments, and the old saying that international aid amounts to taking away 
from the poor of the donor countries for giving to the rich of the receiving countries, 
which, in its apparent paradox, may capture a relevant aspect of international aid.62 What is 
                                                                                                                                               
external sources to which one should refer for control. Moreover many articles are constantly updated and 
are of surprising depth and quality. I must take this opportunity to express my indebtedness to Wikipedia, 
one of the greatest intellectual achievements of our age, for constantly supplying a first information and 
direction on previously  uncharted territories.] 
59 On TRIPS and intellectual property issues concerning less developed countries see Stiglitz, 2007, pp. 103-
132. 
60 An issue in this respect would be competitive export of goods benefiting of lack of intellectual protection 
to developed economies. But this may not be insurmountable, since the developed economies could 
undertake far-reaching specific import controls, as they do on many commodities in general. Of more 
practical relevance may be the lack of actual enforcement of the discipline concerning protection of 
intellectual property, whatever the theoretical obligations associated to the underwriting of TRIPS, and the 
legal measures implemented.  
61 For instance the extension of the economic protection of copyright after 50 years at least after the death of 
the author, contemplated by TRIPS (not to speak of the 70 years of the US or European legislation; see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries%27_copyright_length, and the sources listed there) seems 
hardly to be required to stimulate the production of intellectual works. How reasonable is it to expect that 
the motivation of an author towards intellectual creation be influenced by the economic property rights 
somebody else may have after his own death (not to speak 50 and more years after)? All this simply 
amounts to the imposition of rents for past production of intellectual goods, to the advantage of some who 
were not involved in their creation, reducing their diffusion and enjoyment, not to an incentive for future 
production, 
62 According to Knack (1999) “Aid dependence can undermine institutional quality by weakening 
accountability, encouraging rent seeking and corruption, fomenting conflict over control of aid funds, 
siphoning off scarce talent from the bureaucracy, and alleviating pressures to reform inefficient policies and 
institutions.” And “analyses of cross-country data provide evidence that higher aid levels erode the quality 
of governance, as measured by indexes of bureaucratic quality, corruption, and the rule of law.” For the 
tendency of aid to benefit corrupt and undemocratic governments, see Easterly, 2006, p.133: (according to 
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sometimes overlooked in popular discussions is that aid usually does not directly transfer 
resources to the poorer of the world, since it is governments that act as representatives of 
the inhabitants of a country, and governments in poorer countries are often comparatively 
more corrupt and inefficient.63 There is the damaging possibility that aid be simply wasted 
away and siphoned off by corrupt regimes, or, even worse, spent in armaments, feeding 
third world wars.64 It is argued that aid, analogously to natural resources windfalls, weakens 
the determination to reform and to combat corruption and may hamper growth through 
the so-called Dutch disease, by increasing prices and wage costs.65 Analogously to the rents 
from oil and natural resources, and even more than them, aid has been found to have a 
negative impact on democracy.66 Theoretically speaking aid could aid reform and better 
governance through ex-ante conditionality, but, besides being strongly resented as a 
violation of sovereignty, and sometimes as a plot of richer countries to the detriment of aid 
receivers, smacking of paternalism, neo-colonialism, or even imperialism, ex-ante 
conditionality apparently does not work in practice, at least with respect to the poorer 
countries with worse governance.67 It is also doubtful whether massive aid transfers, as 
proposed by some, could raise the long term growth prospects, even if they could certainly 
increase the short-run average incomes (but not necessarily the incomes of the poor) of the 
recipient countries.68 According to Boone (1995) “Aid does not significantly increase 
investment and growth, nor benefit the poor”.69 On the other hand there is a specific type 
of aid that the more prosperous countries are giving freely and massively, and mostly 
unintentionally, which mostly goes unremarked. Through the scientific progress and the 
technological advances they produce, they create public goods that deeply affect the 
economic and social fabrics of less developed countries. This is probably the fundamental 
explanation of the great economic and demographic advances of most less developed 
countries in relation to their past.70 The same applies to the example provided by the 
                                                                                                                                               
him “aid shifts money from being spent by the best governments in the world to being spent by the 
worst”). For a discussion of this issue and of the way to overcome it see Milanovic (October 2007). To his 
plea for taking into account, in directing aid, the degree in inequality of income distribution in the receiving 
countries, “penalizing countries with highly unequal distribution” one may add that the degree of inequality 
may be seen as an indicator of the extraction power of the elite in a receiving country, and of its power to 
appropriate the advantages of transfers, increasing the probability of the latter acting regressively. 
63 We may refer in this respect to the classification of Transparency International. An extreme case is 
mentioned by Collier (2007b, p. 66): only 1% of the funds spent by the Government of Chad for financing 
rural health clinics actually reached them. Another less extreme case relates to Uganda, where “only around 
20 percent of the money that the Ministry of Finance released for primary schools, other than for teachers’ 
salaries, actually reached the schools” (p. 150). 
64 According to Collier (2007b, p. 103) “something around 40 percent of Africa’s military spending is 
inadvertently financed by aid”.  
65 Collier, 2007b, pp. 40 f. According to Collier (ibidem, p. 102) “large inflows of money without any 
restrictions do not seem to be well spent in many of the countries of the bottom billion.” 
66 See Djankov et alii (2006). 
67 Collier (2007b), pp. 109-110. For a consideration how aid could be tailored to really help the development 
of  “the bottom million”, see Collier’s chapter 7, pp. 99-123. 
68 For a sceptical view on the ability of aid to raise growth of the recipient countries, see in particular Easterly, 
2006, ch. 2, pp. 60-55. An argument making ethically desirable massive income transfers to the poorer 
countries of the world that is frequently advanced refers to the twin legacies of slave trade and colonialism. 
We shall return on this issue later on, in section 5.. 
69 For the discussion following Boone’s controversial paper, and further interesting contributions on the 
issue, see Easterly (2006), pp. 45-50. 
70 See below, tables 5 to 9. 
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economic, social and political institutions of more developed countries, in particular to the 
basic idea of democracy, according to which governments should be changed by the ballot, 
rather than through civil strife and violent means. The latter have the fundamental 
disadvantage, in comparison to the ballot, to be usually much more expensive in terms of 
wasted economic resources, not to speak of the other, non-economic, profiles. Of course 
ballots serve their purpose if they are credible, this means not fundamentally rigged, 
otherwise sham democracy is not of much use. 
4.3.3 Changing the basis of the international economic order 
As to changing the basis of the international economic order from free exchange and 
market to supernational planned allocation and material barters, even aside from the 
concrete issue of its (in)feasibility, the past Comecon experience of planned material 
exchanges is not really enticing; the same applies to the other historical instances where 
barter exchange prevailed, with consequent high transaction costs and greatly reduced gains 
from trading. To some extent distribution is internationally, alike inside nations, a 
consequence of the institutions that regulate and, directly or indirectly, affect production 
and exchange. The institutions that may favour high levels of productivity and growth, 
such as the remarkable performance of the developing countries, aside from the 
unfortunate “bottom billion”, reaching in the last two decades of the last century the 
unprecedented rate of 4 per cent of per capita income growth, and even more in the first 
years of the new millennium,71 have some distributional consequences that only partially 
can be mitigated without affecting economic outcomes. Thus to radically change those 
institutions could be against the interest of the world poor, despite the deep injustice of a 
world where at least 60% of one’s position in the global personal income distribution can 
be explained by the accident of being born in a country instead than somewhere else, and a 
good deal of the rest by the accident of having been born in a family rather than in 
another.72 In reality the greatest practical opportunities for redistribution appear to lie 
inside countries through reform of their institutions and the political process. In lower and 
middle income countries, with good natural resource endowments in particular, the specific 
extractive nature of the institutions, enhanced by the absence of checks and balances, often 
leads to the formation of high incomes based on rents, whereby the resulting high degree 
of inequality (at a Gini coefficient of 40 and above) represents a brake to growth rather 
than a by-product of growth-enhancing institutions and social processes,73 not to speak of 
the much higher risk of civil war and instability associated with “dependence upon primary 
commodity exports”.74 
                                                 
71 Collier, 2007b, p. 8. This finds a counterpart in the transformation of trade and the economic basis, 
whereby actually “80 percent of developing countries exports are manufactures, and service exports are also 
mushrooming.” (Ibidem, p. 81.) 
72 See Milanovic (2008). Owing to the very high relative premium of changing country in relation to the 
restricted probabilities of advancement by remaining in a poor country, the pressure to migrate must be 
very high from poorer countries, especially towards rich countries where income distribution is more 
egalitarian (supposing the expected destination of the migrants to be mostly in the lower distributional 
range of the country of immigration). In turn this may contribute to bring about a lesser egalitarian 
distribution in the receiving countries, because of lower propensity towards redistribution and interclass 
solidarity engineered by increased ethnic differentiation and the immigration pressure. 
73 See Nel (2006), pp. 697-698 and the literature quoted there. 
74 Collier 2007b, p. 21. According to Collier some international charter agreed among all main industrial 
partners requiring  greater transparency in the conditions of exploitation of natural resources, and the 
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The most radical way to overcome this issue would be the cosmopolitan one to make of 
the world a single country, with the power and responsibility to decide and enact 
redistribution policies. One could only (idly) speculate about the kinds of institutions and 
economic governance such a cosmopolitan world would have. But for good or for worse 
humanity is divided into separate territorial states, and solidarity towards the citizens of 
other states is usually much weaker than solidarity towards fellow citizens, or, even more, 
especially where there are strong ethnic divisions inside states, towards one’s own ethnic 
community. Moreover measures of solidarity are also the outcome of the fact that citizens, 
however destitute, are partaking into, and therefore have some scope for influencing 
through collective action, the political process, albeit with quite different degrees, according 
to its specific characteristics. Thus “the state is, for the time being, the only legitimate 
context within which relative deprivation can be addressed through redistributive policies 
and practices”, and “it is at the level of states only that the principles of distributive justice 
can and may apply, as it is on this level alone that we have the institutional means to 
legitimately take from the rich and give to the poor”. For good or for worse, people will 
belong to separate states for a long time to come, rather than being simply citizens of the 
world, and this will limit the degree of solidarity and redistribution at the world level.75 John 
Lennon’s utopia of Imagine there's no countries …. Nothing to kill or die for -- And no religion too is 
unfortunately very far off.76 
4.3.3.1 Breaking the actual international economic order with the violence of the worse off 
We have seen that a suitable alternative to the basic principles of the actual international 
economic order and to increasing globalization does not seem to exist. As to a general 
process of income redistribution among the states of the world, this seems utterly 
unrealistic (and not necessarily productive of a substantial betterment of the situation of 
the worse off of the world). But let us suppose that redistribution is forced by the less 
developed countries through violence, analogously to what has often happened in the 
historical past, when the civilizations of the Middle East, South- East Asia and Europe 
were invaded or taken at ransom by warlike “barbaric” peoples coming down from the 
fringes of the civilized centre. Could a forced world redistribution through violence be 
achieved? Let us suppose that conquest and domination by the less developed could be 
achieved through the unwillingness of the more developed to resort to the means available 
to defend themselves (such as for instance the use of atomic power). Could this bring 
betterment and prosperity to the masses of the poor of the world? This seems hardly a 
possibility. The idea that an advanced country, whose main wealth is the stock of its human 
capital could be run through domination and violent coercion to the benefit of some 
conqueror, much poorer because endowed with much less human capital, does not seem 
                                                                                                                                               
utilization of the rents thereof, would be of great help in improving the way in which those revenues are 
spent. To the obvious objection that China’s unconditional scrambling for the underdeveloped world’s 
natural resources would break any conceivable charter, Collier’s rather unpersuasive counterargument is 
that “The West has to offer China greater inclusion in power in return for adherence to international 
standards.” (Ibidem, p. 146.)  
75 Cf. Neal, 2006, pp.702-703. 
76 On the other hand to have peoples belonging to different sovereign constituencies (“states”) can be 
optimal if people are clustered in groups with distinct culture and preferences (cf. on this Muller 2005), this 
means until “globalization” will eventually have unified culture and prevailing preferences all over the 
world. But even in this case some technical problems of managing very large constituencies could lead to 
the optimal subdivision of the world into distinct sovereign states.  
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realistic.77 And it seems also unrealistic that under some hypothetic circumstances the 
ruling elite of the conquering state would exert its exploitation of the conquered to the 
benefit of the poor of their state rather than of itself. We shall return later on these issues  
4.3.4 The problem of the “fragile” states 
A related problem to which no easy solution can be seen is that of the so-called fragile 
states, “countries with particularly weak governance, institutions, and capacity…often in 
conflict”78 (where either internal or external conflicts are often at the origin of “fragility”), 
which did not partake of recent world economic growth, and are plagued by particularly 
severe problems of extreme poverty, high child mortality, and illiteracy. Short of neo-
colonialist endeavours, which could hardly be a choice, the only way seems to hope that, 
favoured by the impact of globalization and institutional imitation, and possibly through 
the help of the international community, their internal dynamics could evolve so as to bring 
about a more favourable environment, in particular through the overcoming of the violent 
conflicts often at the origin of “fragility”. Indeed, as argued by Collier (2007b, p. 31), a 
greater participation in peace keeping by the international community, in order to reduce 
the probability to conflict reversion, could be the best form of aid. As to peace enforcing, 
and nation and institution building, this is a much more tricky issue, because of its neo-
colonialist connotations and implied violation of national sovereignty, lack of consensus by 
the international community, and lack of volunteers to offer the needed resources and face 
the inevitable losses and expenditures. The history of humanity is a long history of horrors. 
We surely cannot do anything about the horrors of the past. Probably we cannot do much 
about the horrors of the future. Only a delirium of omnipotence can lead us to believe that 
we should be able to deal with all the horrors of the present. We may just be left with the 
solution of ending the patronizing approach,79 leaving fragile states to do their own 
experiences, as everybody else has done in the past, and learn through generations how to 
progress, forming and changing their own institutions. But our world has become much 
more impatient with historical time, the perceptions of contemporary horrors is enhanced 
by the spread of information and of visual representation all over the world, and we have 
become used to the idea that, by resorting to appropriate techniques, reforms, and 
interventions, we could solve all human and social problems. Moreover a country’s internal 
disturbances may severely impact on its neighbours, not only as a consequence of the 
collapse of trade following the collapse of the economy, but especially by originating 
massive sudden migrations, and by the spreading abroad of internal disturbances, as well as 
diseases.80 We may just remind the disastrous consequences of Ruanda’s internal conflicts 
on Congo/Zaire or, quite recently, of Mugabe’s autocratic follies for the internal peace of 
South Africa, and of the internal conflict and absence of a state in Somalia for the safety of 
sea routes. A paradigmatic case is the massive influx of refugees (estimated at 11 million) 
from Bangladesh to India after the Pakistan military repression in 1971, amounting to 
“demographic aggression”, and prompting the Indian intervention in the conflict, resulting 
in Bangladesh independence.81 The consequences of failed states on the outside world can 
                                                 
77 See Simon (1989), p. 175. 
78 World Bank (2007, pp. 2-3). 
79 The latter is exposed and lamented by Easterly, and others (cf. Easterly, 2006, pp. 26-27). 
80 Cf. Collier, 2007b, p. 31. 
81 Cf. Marwah, 1979, p. 560. 
 - 23 -
be indeed very severe, even if only the economically measurable aspects are taken into 
consideration.82 
4.3.5 Migration 
A way to mitigate the plight of the worse off as well as of remedying the injustice of the 
strict interrelation of one’s place of birth and one’s life prospects that has been mentioned 
before could be to allow unrestricted immigration from the poorer to the richer countries. 
Considering that the prospect that improving one’s lot in a poorer country is bound to be 
much greater through emigration than through internal advancement (as we have seen the 
one’s lifetime income depends at least for the 60% of the country of residence) and the 
huge differences in per capita incomes and living standards, we may just easily understand 
that the pressure towards immigration in the richer countries appears almost irresistible. 
Taking into account the overall number of the world poor, one can appreciate the 
enormous migratory potential towards the more prosperous (or even the less poor) 
countries in a shrinking world, with potential far-reaching social and political consequences. 
Countries of emigration can at the same time become countries of immigration from even 
poorer countries, such as notably in the case of Eastern Europe as a whole, or of North 
Africa.83 In the usual model of international trade free migration leads to greater efficiency 
(in the sense of the principle of compensation), but the political and social consequences in 
the immigration countries of unrestricted migration, which could deeply affect the social 
fabric, and thus the conditions of production, investment, and exchange, are not 
considered. At present those who succeed in reaching the heavens of a the richer country 
have at least a heaven where to turn on. If present world heavens were reduced to hell, 
reproducing the illnesses of the countries from which people are flying, there would no 
heaven for anybody and trade and other interaction opportunities would be negatively 
affected. Indeed, in case the costs of immigration were drastically reduced by abolishing the 
administrative constraints, as seemingly advocated by Bhagwati,84 and more or less 
explicitly by many others,85 this would bring about as a logical consequence that the 
migration flows would intensify up to the point where the worse off in the better off 
countries would be about as bad off as the worse off in the worst off countries. The 
consequences in the richer countries could be disastrous for equality and social cohesion, 
possibly leading to the same degree of ethnic violence plaguing the most unfortunate of the 
developing countries, with negative economic consequences, which could reverberate 
disastrously on the poorer countries themselves. 86 But such an outcome is rather 
theoretical. After all, no country in the world does admit free immigration. As Bhagwati 
                                                 
82 According to a rough estimate by Collier (2007b, p.103) the “costs of a typical civil war” are around $ 64 
billion. Collier’s quantitative analysis, as well his favourable attitude to peace keeping and peace 
enforcement, are severely criticized by Easterly (2007), according to whom “If Collier’s statistical analysis 
does not hold up under scrutiny, unfortunately, then his recommendations are not a reliable guide for 
deploying foreign aid, technical assistance, or armies. Economists should not be allowed to play games with 
statistics, much less with guns” (p. 1476).  
83 On South-South migrations see Hujo and Piper, 2007. 
84 Bhagwati, 2007, pp. 217-218. 
85 Quite often whatever limitation to immigration flows is blamed for its unsavoury (and to some extent 
inevitable) humanitarian consequences, without explicitly advocating free immigration. But to criticize any 
limitation to immigration flows logically amounts to the advocacy of unlimited immigration.  
86 For a discussion of the issue of what the consequences of unrestricted immigration would be, see Chilosi, 
2002. 
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himself reminds us (2007. p. 218) “immigration restrictions are the flip side of 
sovereignty”. 
Some relief could be derived by the degree of migration that the richer countries are 
accepting to have. But the consequences of migration for those left in the poorer countries 
are by no means straightforward. On the one hand there are the advantages of the 
remittals, and the lower demographic pressure on scarce natural resources and the 
environment, on the other the potentially huge losses of human capital.  
5. Soul-searching and self-bashing 
Tied to the issue of the evaluation of the present economic order is the issue of the 
historical responsibility of the West in the plight of the Rest. Overall the impact of the 
West has been mixed.87 On the one hand it has played with greater efficiency, owing to its 
recent technological superiority, the same deadly games played by most of humanity for 
most of the time. On the other it has spread modern social and technological innovations, 
with dramatic long-run consequences in terms of improvement of the economic and living 
standards of most of the Rest. It has also spread its germs, with a deadly  impact for some 
populations, in particular in South America.88 But in the historical interaction of peoples it 
is difficult to do cherry-picking: the same technological and organizational dominance that 
has made the West deadly for some has brought about the improvement of the living 
standards of the many through almost universal imitation. 
How much are the plight of poorer countries and the affluence of richer ones due to 
colonialism? And how much is the misery of Africa in particular a consequence of the 
transatlantic slave trade? How much does the responsibility of the latter fall on European 
shoulders?  
5.1 Colonialism 
Branko Milanovic has recently produced an interesting inquiry into the first issue 
(Milanovic, 2005). According to his quantitative analysis on a large historical statistical data 
base, colonialism has not appreciably helped nor damaged on balance the economic 
development either of colonial powers or of colonies.This is consistent with the fact that 
“colonies accounted for only a minor share of the trade and investment of developed 
countries in the nineteenth century, and most of the greatly expanded world trade and 
investment was carried on within the developed bloc itself” (Easterlin, 1996, p 2). “In the 
half century before World War I the market for developed countries’ exports were chiefly 
in other developed  countries, and the principal suppliers of primary products requirements 
of the developed countries were other developed countries…Considering Great Britain, 
France, and Germany together, on the eve of World War II, their own Third World 
colonies accounted for only 11 percent of their merchandise trade and 12 percent of their 
foreign investment” (ibidem, p. 43).89 One must also consider that the advantages of 
empire, the exploitation of the colonies to the benefit of the metropolis, must be balanced 
with the costs of empire, military, human, administrative, and of infrastructural investment. 
Milanovic study confirms Bairoch’s view concerning the lack of noticeable positive 
                                                 
87 For a concise assessment of the mixed impact of the West on the Rest, cf. Woodruff, 1983 [1966], the 
“Epilogue”, pp. 335-341. 
88 See Woodruff, 1983 [1966], p. 340; Diamond (1997). 
89 Cf. also Bairoch, 1997, pp. 675-678. 
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consequences of colonial empires on the economic development of the metropolis. Indeed, 
as Bairoch remarks (p. 673), if one looks at the growth performance of European countries 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries those who grew the most were the countries 
without colonies, and this applies even more to the USA (p. 674). As far as colonies are 
concerned, Milanovic’s inquiry considers the growth performance of former colonies 
before and after independence, in relation to that of the rest of the world, and no particular 
change is detected after independence. An interpretation could be that on average an 
exploitative structure is substituted to another. One is left then with the question whether 
the responsibility for accommodating the country along an exploitative path could be 
attributed to the colonial rule itself. According to Bairoch (p. 665) the economic 
development of the colonies was damaged by an exploitative “colonial pact” to the benefit 
of the metropolis (pp. 665-668). One is however somewhat puzzled by the fact that this 
“pact”, hindering the development of manufacturing industry in the colonies, applied also 
to the colonies of European settlement (p. 667): it does not seem that the development of 
the “Western Offshoots” did suffer because of this in the long-run, as purportedly 
happened to the third world colonies. In a sense this is an issue of counterfactuals: what 
would have happened if there had been no colonial rule. Perhaps the only way to answer 
this question is to look at the different performance of countries and territories that were 
not subjected to colonial rule vs. those that were subjected. Unfortunately the sample of 
the latter is rather limited. May be it could be enriched including those territories that were 
independent since long (say Haiti or Liberia) to be compared with those that achieved 
independence since the 1960s. Perhaps the only obvious conclusion that can be reached is 
that the colonial territories that were subjected to massive population transfers from 
Europe (the “Western Offshoots”) fared even better than the metropolis, while those 
populations that, because of remoteness or inhospitable territories, were immune to a great 
extent to the colonial encroachment continued their ancient modes of living, with all its 
advantages and disadvantages. Some additional casual remarks may be in place: Thailand, 
that remained independent, fared rather well in the long run, but no better than their 
previously colonized neighbours, such as South Korea or Taiwan or Malaysia. Japan, that 
underwent the near-colonial shock of Commodore Perry’s intrusion fared very well and 
became a powerful industrial country, part itself of the world of colonizers. Haiti, that was 
independent since the beginning of the nineteenth century, fared badly, much worse than 
other Caribbean nations which gained independence more recently. Of course, even in the 
more favourable cases, colonization, aside from the distasteful aspects of foreign 
domination, leads to a deep intrusion in the very identity of the colonized peoples. But to 
the same analogous intrusion and estrangement from their traditional heritage leads also 
the globalization of our times. When one refers to the responsibility of colonialism one has 
to deal with this kind of questions for which is not easy to produce a plausible answer: 
would have the countries colonized fared any better without colonial conquest? Would the 
alternative to colonization have been peaceful progress rather than continuous 
backwardness, persistent violence and frequent wars?  
Moreover colonialism has a long history, much before western colonization: indeed, 
“colonization is a constant feature of the history of mankind.”90 All the empires of 
antiquity, up to the more recent Arab or Ottoman empires were colonizers before western 
                                                 
90 “la colonisation est une constante de l’ histoire de l’ humanité. L’ histoire de la colonisation se confond 
presque avec l’ histoire universelle.” (Bairoch, 1997), p. 548. 
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colonialism, partaking with the latter the following features (singled out by Bairoch) 1. the 
imposition of the civilization of the colonizers; 2. the subordination of the colonies to the 
interest of the metropolis; 3. ethnical and religious discrimination.91 
However repulsive for our modern sensibility is the imperialist idea to conquer a militarily 
weaker country and rule it by force in the interest of the conqueror, the countries that were 
conquered and subjected to colonial domination were not usually peaceful prosperous 
heavens. By and large the West and the Rest were players of the same historical game, of 
violent territorial expansion and domination, war, plunder, and conquest, that only quite 
recently has been relinquished and declared illegal by most part of humanity.92 In the 
history of humanity evil has always been banal, or, even more, what we moderns consider 
evil was often not seen as such, or was simply cloaked under false pretensions, such as 
saving through conversion the souls of the infidels, as in the 1455 Papal Bull Romanus 
Pontifex, legitimizing the slave trade93, or King Leopold’s pretence to administer Congo for 
exclusive humanitarian purposes. As is often the case in what we may see as the progress of 
the moral awareness of humanity some activities that in an epoch are considered as 
legitimate, are subsequently perceived as crimes. The history of mankind is a dense 
collection of actions of the kind that nowadays are defined as crimes against humanity; 
even genocides can be extolled in sacred books as acts of pious obedience to God.94 
5.2 Slavery 
Let us turn now to the specific responsibility of the West on slavery. Slavery has been 
practiced by humanity from time immemorial, and probably very few parts of the earth 
have been immune. Africa has certainly been no exception.95 Trans-Saharan slave trade in 
particular was practised to a large scale before the encroachment of the Europeans, but 
slave trade towards Asia was also substantial.96 With the advantage of European technology 
and organization, and pulled by the demand of the new plantation economies of the New 
World, slave trade reached from the sixteenth century onward unheard of dimensions. But 
in partaking blames and responsibilities one should consider that European traders were 
taking care (so to speak) of transport and marketing, while the actual production of slaves 
was the domain of the Africans themselves and, even before the transatlantic trade, the 
capture and trade of slaves was one of the main economic activities of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
If to the demerit and shame of the Europeans should be ascribed the massive extent of the 
transatlantic trade, to their merit and honour it must be attributed having made slave trade 
and slavery illegal, extending the prohibition of slavery to their colonial domains, thus 
bringing eventually to an end a time immemorial historical tradition of legal slavery and 
legal slave trade. 97  
                                                 
91 Bairoch, 1997, p. 549 
92 For an outline of the history of African autochthonous kingdoms and empires and of their wars, see 
Collins and Burns (2007). For the usual bellicosity and extreme violence of the “peoples without history” 
on which colonialism encroached, see Keeley (1996). 
93 Maddison, 2006, p 60. 
94 Such as in the story of Saul and the Amalekites in the Bible. 
95 The oldest documentation of slavery in Africa dates back to 2900 BC (Collins and Burns, p. 202).  
96 Cf. Collins and Burns, 2007, pp. 202-247; Maddison, 2006, pp. 574-575. Hellie, 2007. 
97 Notable were in particular the British 1807 “Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade" and the 1833 
“Slavery Abolition Act”. But sporadic measures for the abolition of slavery and or/slave trade were taken 
even before, such as the abolition of slave trade by Denmark in 1792, effective in 1803. In ancient times 
Cyrus the Great decreed the abolition of slavery in the Persian Empire in 539 BC, and the Chinese emperor 
 - 27 -
6. The population explosion  
In a secular (or rather millennial) perspective, before the Industrial Revolution population 
growth was held in check by high mortality rates, which were accompanying high birth 
rates. The source of high mortality rates in a classical Malthusian perspective could have 
been the limitation in the amount of available agricultural resources, either continuously, 
leading to poor nutrition (and therefore to higher morbidity and premature deaths), or 
episodically, through famines. But there were also other forces at play.98 First of all very 
high rates of child mortality, either through systematic infanticide (itself probably a 
function of available resources), especially of females, or as a consequences of neglect and 
of poor living, childbearing, and childrearing conditions. Second, possible neglect of the 
elders, the disabled and the infirm. Third the spread of epidemic diseases (which was 
favoured by overcrowding and poor living conditions in the cities of agricultural societies). 
Then, endemic warfare, between tribes, nations or individuals, leading to direct deaths, as 
well as to misdirection and destruction of the resources otherwise available for survival.99 
Still, following the improvements of agricultural technology in particular, there was some 
population growth at a very slow pace, slightly accelerating in time, as shown in table 6.100 
Later on, especially since the half of the nineteenth century, the decrease in mortality rates 
(a true “mortality revolution” “which has resulted in doubling or more of average life 
expectancy at birth”101 and has been the direct consequence of the diffusion of medical 
                                                                                                                                               
Wang Mang in China at the beginning of the Christian Era. For a more comprehensive picture see Hellie 
(2007) or Wikipedia’s entry “Abolition of Slavery Timeline” (as of 14/9/09);. for the long path leading to 
the legal abolition of slavery in the twentieth century, see Miers, 2003, Bairoch, 738-740, 778-782. The 
last countries where slavery was legally abolished were the Arab countries: Saudi Arabia in 1962, 
Mauritania in 1981. Illegal or semi-legal slavery unfortunately still exists in many countries (besides Miers’ 
authoritative volume, see Bales, 2004, and Wikipedia’s entry “Slavery in Modern Africa”(as of 14/9/09)). 
For the persistence of slavery in Mauritania see Amnesty International, 2002. For the place of slavery in 
Islam and some contemporary authoritative opinions by Islamic scholars legitimizing slavery see the entry 
“Islam and Slavery” of Wikipedia (accessed 14/9/2009) and the sources quoted there. 
98 In Malthus’ own words: “The positive checks to population are extremely various, and include every cause, 
whether arising from vice or misery, which in any degree contributes to shorten the natural duration of 
human life. Under this head, therefore, may be enumerated all unwholesome occupations, severe labour 
and exposure to the seasons, extreme poverty, bad nursing of children, great towns, excesses of all kinds, 
the whole train of common diseases and epidemics, wars, plague, and famine.” Malthus 1826 [1798], I.II.9. 
99 According to Ember (1978) about 60% of the societies of hunter gatherers of which there is 
documentation were recorded to be at war at least once every two years. Even more drastic is the picture 
traced by Keeley (1996) concerning the propensity to war and violence of ancient and modern pre-historical 
societies (pre-historical in the sense of “peoples without written history”). As to pre-industrial civilizations it 
is enough to recall world and European history (for instance, considering European history immediately 
preceding the Industrial Revolution, in the 16th century 95% of the time there were wars involving the 
major European powers, 94% in the 17th and 78% in the 18th century; cf. Eloranta, 2005). For the issue of 
population control in pre-industrial societies, with a survey of the relevant literature, see Caldwell and 
Caldwell (2003). 
100 The relation between population growth and agricultural technology was stressed by Boserup (1965), even 
if in Boserup’s work the causal relation was supposed to act in the contrary sense than the one implied 
above; the crucial element being the density of population affecting the length of fallows. However this 
could be the case if a complete blueprint of alternative agricultural techniques were to exist at any given 
time, not if alternative agricultural techniques had to be discovered, or rediscovered, in a lengthy historical 
process. For a critical assessment of Boserup’s work, see Federico (2001). On the other hand Boserup’s 
argument could be reinterpreted as pointing towards endogenous technological progress in agriculture 
being stimulated by demographic conditions (see on this Cuffaro, 2001, pp. 67 f.).  
101 Easterlin, 1996, p. 1. 
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knowledge and discoveries that has followed with some delay the Industrial Revolution) 
has led to a much faster population growth, while the demographic consequences of two 
world wars and related upheavals are shown in a temporary decrease of growth rates. The 
post World War II period has seen an unprecedented population explosion, with some 
signs of abating however following increasing living standards and progresses in the 
technology of birth control, spreading from the more advanced countries to the lesser 
developed areas of the world, leading to a forecast of about 9.2 billion around the year 
2050.102 
What have been the causes of the post World War II world population explosion? 
Essentially the reduction in mortality rates and the increase in life expectancy (see the tables 
in the Statistical Appendix at the end). The birth rate has on the whole decreased in the 
post-war period, but the increase in life expectancy has been stronger; 17 years between 
1950 to 1999 in the world as a whole, more or less the same as in the first half of the 
twentieth century, three times more than the increase of life expectancy in the crucial eighty 
years of the spread of the industrial revolution, from 1820 to 1900. One may also note that 
all the areas of the world have partaken in the great advance in life expectancy,103 while the 
present inequality in average life expectancy between the different areas (about 50% 
between the highest, Western Europe, and the lowest, Africa), is much lower than either in 
wealth or in income (see the Statistical Appendix; with respect to some other life statistics, 
however, the picture is more extreme). Moreover, “differences in lifetime survival rates 
between rich and poor countries and between rich and poor individuals within countries 
were much higher two centuries ago than they are now”, and “over the past century, the 
life span gap between poor and rich countries has narrowed dramatically” (Milanovic et alii, 
2007, p. 28 and p. 24). It is interesting to note, to understand what has been accomplished 
in the course of the very short historical span of two centuries that the worst off in terms 
of life expectancy, the “Africans south of the Sahara survive a bit longer today … (even 
including the impact of AIDS), than did the English in the early nineteenth century when 
they had the world’s longest life spans” (ibidem, p. 26). According to Bourguignon and 
Morrison (2002, p. 741) the inequality in world life expectancy started to decrease from the 
beginning of the second quarter of the 20-th century, while the inequality in per capita 
income distribution continued to increase. One of the reasons of the population explosion 
in the post WWII period lies in the impact of the Green Revolution in third world 
countries, such as Mexico and India, leading to the strong growth of agricultural 
production, as well as in the improvements in transportation.104 There was no major 
demographic catastrophe, of the kind that in the old times were blocking demographic 
                                                 
102 Cf. United Nations, 2006. 
103 Cf. tables 4A and 5A. 
104 With the “Green Revolution” modern agricultural techniques and high productivity seeds were imported 
from the developed world into developing countries through organized efforts spurred first by the 
Rockefeller Foundation (starting from Mexico in 1944), to which the Ford Foundation later joined forces. 
The result was that “the adoption of High Yelding Varieties (HYVs) enormously increased the productivity 
of land and labor” (Federico, 2005, p. 214). For comprehensive statistical data on agricultural growth see 
ibidem, pp. 233 f. However in a number of areas, in particular in Africa, and Latin America, the methods of 
the Green Revolution have encountered fundamental organizational and environmental obstacles (on this 
see Cuffaro, 2001, chapters 5 and. 6, in particular pp. 117 f.). But taking into account the increasing 
integration of the world food market, productivity advances in some countries can have a favourable impact 
on the food balance in others through their effect on world supply and prices, anyway. 
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advance in a secular perspective.105 (For some relevant demographic data we may refer to 
the statistical appendix at the end.) 
 
Table 6. Yearly average rates of population growth 1-2007106 (in percentages) 
 1-1000 
1000-
1500 
1500-
1820 
1820-
1870 
1870-
1913 
1913-
1950 
1950-
1973 
1973-
2001 
2001-
2007 
Western 
Europe 0.06 0.16 0.26 0.69 0.77 0.42 0.71 0.32 0.26 
Eastern 
Europe 0.03 0.15 0.31 0.77 0.92 0.26 1.01 0.32 -0.03 
Former USSR 0.06 0.17 0.37 0.97 1.33 0.38 1.44 0.54 -0.15 
Western 
offshoots107 0.05 0.07 0.44 2.86 2.07 1.25 1.54 1.09 0.94 
Latin America 0.07 0.09 0.07 1.25 1.63 1.96 2.73 1.96 1.3 
Japan 0.09 0.14 0.22 0.21 0.95 1.32 1.14 0.55 0.06 
Total Asia 
excl. Japan 0.00 0.09 0.29 0.15 0.55 0.92 2.19 1.80 1.29 
Africa 0.07 0.07 0.15108 0.40 0.75 1.64 2.37 2.69 2.36 
World 0.01 0.10 0.27 0.40 0.80 0.93 1.93 1.62 1.20 
                                                 
105 Such as in the case of the Black Death. The only globally relevant demographic catastrophe in the post 
War II period could have been a population deficit of an undetermined (and undeterminable) few tens of 
millions Chinese as a consequence of the famine following Mao’s Great Leap Forward: “a dip in the growth 
rate from 1959-1960… was due to the Great Leap Forward in China. During that time, both natural 
disasters and decreased agricultural output in the wake of massive social reorganization caused China's 
death rate to rise sharply and its fertility rate to fall by almost half” (US Census Bureau, 18/7/2007; the dip 
could be graphically seen in the sudden fall in the line of the population growth rate reported in the site of 
the World Population Clock). According to Yao (1999) the demographic deficit in the three years 1959-61 was 
somewhat higher than 49 million, of which about 18.5 million extra deaths and the rest lost births. Not a 
big difference anyway to the size of world population at the time, of about 3 billion. For other estimates 
one could refer to the literature quoted by Yao, in particular Peng Xizhe (1987). 
106 Source of the data of the last column: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base, at 
http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/agggen; the remaining data are taken from Maddison (2006), p. 637. If 
we concentrate our attention to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the periodization of table 6 
below, we can see that the highest rate of population growth in history has taken place in the years 1950-73, 
slightly less but still remarkable was the rate of growth of population in 1870-1913, while the low rates in 
the period 1914-1950 were certainly due to the impact of two world wars and of their aftermath. The 
negative rate of growth in the latest period can be fairly attributed to the social and economic disruptions 
following the fall of the communist regimes. 
107 USA, Canada, New Zealand, Australia. 
108 One may be puzzled by the acceleration of the demographic development of Africa in a period of massive 
slave transatlantic trade. The answer seems to lie in the fact that “although some areas of Africa were 
depleted by slave raiding, on balance the African population grew after the establishment of the 
transatlantic slave trade because of new food crops introduced from the New World, particularly manioc, 
corn (maize), and possibly peanuts” (Hellie, 2007). Cf. also Collins and Burns, 2007, pp. 198-199, 311 (p. 
199: “The introduction of New World and Asian crops transformed many African agricultural societies, 
enabling them to expand into the vast unpopulated lands of the continent.”); Maddison, 2006, p. 569. The 
demographic consequences of the new crops were somewhat compensated however by the spread of new 
diseases brought by the Europeans (Collins and Burns, pp. 199-200). 
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7. Maddison’s statistical summing-up of world economic growth 
Even in the poorest of continents, Africa, per capita income has strongly increased (about 
three times; an unprecedented performance) since the spreading to the whole world of the 
present mode of production that followed the industrial revolution (see Table 7). This has 
taken place notwithstanding the rapid population growth, which in the post World War II 
years has become the highest in the world (2.69% yearly in the period 1973-2001, 
somewhat decreased to 2,36% in the last six years; cf. Table 6).   
According to Maddison’s statistical account (somewhat daring, owing to the length of the 
historical period covered), per capita income has decreased in Western Europe during the 
first 1000 years of our era, from 450PP$ to 400 (where 400 stays for the physical 
subsistence level), reaching a nadir around 600 AD, and then starting a very slow 
recovery.109 In that period the rest of the world fared slightly better, per capita incomes 
being throughout the period somewhat higher in Africa (430 at 1AD, 425 at 1000AD), and 
in Asia (450 in both years), while the remaining areas were still at low subsistence level 
(400). Five hundred years later the world as a whole had made some modest progress (from 
436 to 566). Italy was by far the richest country with 1100PPP$, but was stagnating until 
the Industrial Revolution (1820). The territories that were to become the Western 
Offshoots were the poorest at 400, Africa had somewhat declined at 414, stagnating until 
the colonial conquests of the nineteenth century, China had progressed from 450 to 600, 
staying at that level until 1820 and declining afterwards, down to 439 in 1950, Japan also 
progressed reaching 737 in 1820. At the threshold of the Industrial Revolution, in 1700, the 
richest world country were the Netherlands with 2130, Western Europe was somewhat 
lower than 1000PPP$ on average.110 
                                                 
109 The data for the year 1 in Western Europe and Asia are considered implausibly low by Federico (2002, p. 
115). Federico’s viewpoint  is consistent with Milanovic (December 2004) estimate of 840 (p. 22) or 
between 800 and 900 1990 PPP$ (p. 23) as the average per capita income of the Roman empire at the times 
of Augustus. 
110 For the detailed country data one is referred to Maddison (2006, p. 639). 
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Table 7. World Per Capita GDP, Regional Averages, 1-2001 AD111 (1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars)112 
 1  1000  1500  1600 1700 1820 1870 1913  1950  1973  2001  
Western Europe  450  400  771  890  998  1 204 1 960 3 458  4 579  11,416 19,256
Eastern Europe  400  400  496  548  606  683  937  1 695  2 111  4 988  6 027  
Former USSR  400  400  499  552  610  688  943  1 488  2 841  6 059  4 626  
Western 
Offshoots 400  400  400  400  476  1 202 2 419 5 233  9 268  16,179 26,943 
Latin America 400  400  416  438  527  692  681  1 481  2 506  4 504  5 811  
Japan  400  425  500  520  570  669  737  1 387  1 921  11,434 20,683 
Asia (excl. Japan)  450  450  572  575  571  577  550  658  634  1 226  3 256  
Africa  430  425  414  422  421  420  500  637  894  1 410  1 489  
World  445  436  566  595  615  667  875  1 525  2 111  4 091  6 049  
 
Economic growth has been accompanied, wherever data are available, by a great reduction, 
in many cases almost a halving, since 1870, of labour time (Maddison, 2006, p. 347). And 
hence by an enormous growth of hourly labour productivity (p. 351). Notwithstanding the 
reduction in labour time, production per worker has greatly increased (about ten times 
since 1870 in Western Europe: Maddison, 2006, p. 349). Perusing the above data it 
becomes obvious that at the time Marx was writing Das Kapital no amount of redistribution 
could have ever brought about the dramatic improvement in the living standards of the 
masses that technical progress and development (“the development of productive forces”) 
would have brought about in less than a life-span. Thus Marx (1875) was right in 
downplaying the issue of distribution as such. Distribution may be important in the short-
run for allowing some of the worse-off to improve their lot. In the long run for the worse 
off it is more important the relation between distribution, technical improvements, 
production and accumulation 
                                                 
111 Maddison, 2006, p. 642. 
112 For a definition of Geary-Khamis dollars cf. United Nations, 1992. 
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Table 8113Growth of Per Capita GDP by Major Regions, 0–1998 (annual average compound growth rate)  
 0–1000 1000–1500 1500–1600 1600–1700 1700–1820 1820–1998 
       
Western Europe –0.01 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15 1.51 
Western Offshoots 0 0 0 0.17 0.78 1.75 
Japan 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.13 1.93 
Group A –0.01 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.18 1.67 
       
Latin America 0 0.01 0.09 0.19 0.19 1.22 
Eastern Europe & 
former USSR 0 0.04 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.06 
Asia (excluding Japan) 0 0.05 0.01 –0.01 0.01 0.92 
Africa –0.00 –0.01 0 0 0.04 0.67 
Group B –0.00 0.04 0.02 0 0.03 0.95 
World –0.00 0.05 0.05 –0.00 0.05 1.21 
 
 
Table 9.114 Growth of Per Capita GDP by Major Region, 1820-2001 (annual average compound growth rate) 
 1820–70 1870–1913 1913–50 1950–73 1973–2001 
Western Europe 0.98 1.33 0.76 4.05 1.88 
Eastern Europe 0.63 1.39 0.60 3.81 0.68 
Former USSR 0.63 1.06 1.76 3.35 -0.96 
Western Offshoots 1.41 1.810 01.56 2.45 1.84 
Japan 0.19 1.48 0.88 8.06 2.14 
Latin America -0.03 1.82 1.43 2.58 1.84 
Asia (excluding Japan) -0.10 0.42 -0.10 2.91 3.55 
Africa 0.35 0.57 0.92 2 0.19 
World 0.54 1.30 0.88 2.92 1.41 
 
                                                 
113 Source: Maddison (2006, pp. 30; 643). 
114 Data taken from Maddison (2006, p. 643). 
 - 33 -
8. The very long perspective of the world economic history according to the Malthusian 
viewpoint 
Fig. 1 The Malthusian trap (“world economic history in one picture” ), according to Gregory Clark115  
 
A possible interpretation of available historical evidence is the Malthusian view. Up to the 
dawn of industrial revolution the great majority of humans were on the brink of physical 
survival. In a very long perspective there was by and large a Malthusian equilibrium 
between population and resources, with a very weak long run growth, amounting to near 
stagnation, of world population.116 Under such circumstances distribution of income and 
wealth affects in the long run the size of the population (because unequal distribution uses 
up resources that could allow a larger population to subsist), but not the living standards of 
the masses. At the same time the existence of privileged strata, which in the short run at 
least are somewhat out of the Malthusian trap, can affect the well being of the worse off 
through the externalities they generate. These could be negative (envy and the sense of 
relative deprivation) or positive (the hope, however slim, to be able to raise among the 
privileged, some identification with their interest and life experience).117 Their relative 
impact may depend, among others, on the degree of mobility in the society concerned. 
Religion could surrogate mobility in this world with a belief in mobility in the afterworld. 
                                                 
115 Fig. 1.1 in Clark (2007). 
116 Clark’s 2007 book is a recent representation of this viewpoint. 
117 According to Kenny (2006), and the empirical enquires reported by him, economic and social inequalities 
can have a powerful negative effect on subjective measures of poverty and deprivation, so their impact in 
the past, when they were associated with even greater differences in status and rights than in the present 
times, could have been far more devastating than nowadays. Kenny also underlines the negative impact of 
increasing expectations and of new consumer goods on welfare or happiness. But happiness is a rather 
subjective matter, as is well expressed by the Italian poet Metastasio: “Se a ciascun l'interno affanno si 
leggesse in fronte scritto, quanti mai, che invidia fanno, ci farebbero pietà!” (If everybody’ s internal pain 
were written on their forehead, many who are envied now, would be pitied instead.) As economists, we may 
content ourselves of dealing with per capita incomes, but with a lot of caveats, among others of the kind 
argued by Kenny. On happiness and economic growth see also Easterlin, 1996, pp. 131-144. 
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Even in the slave society of ancient Rome slaves had some degree of hope to be liberated, 
and even to become affluent or, in Christian times, to earn after death, alike their rich 
masters, and ever more than they, the Kingdom of Heaven. Moreover the existence of 
some strata that were able to enjoy a surplus over subsistence could have been an engine 
(however very inefficient) of progress in living patterns, and an instrument for providing 
the resources for some to devote themselves to art, technology and science, with eventual 
long run benefits for average living standards, as well as cultural benefits for mankind.  
Moreover if a priori, under the veil of ignorance, as under Rawles’ paradigm, one should 
have chosen two different possible societies where to live, one with a smaller population in 
Malthusian demographic equilibrium with inequalities, and another one with larger 
population in Malthusian demographic equilibrium with lower or absent inequalities, it is 
not quite clear that the choice would have been for the second alternative, given that to the 
first one, unlike the second, is associated some probability of finding oneself better off, 
once the veil of ignorance is dispelled, than in the egalitarian Malthusian subsistence 
alternative. 
Other utilizations of surplus, aside from nurturing a ruling and/or parasitic elite, were for 
collective purposes, such as building cathedrals or waging wars, the latter possibly being in 
itself one of the principal instruments, through their disruptive consequences, as well as the 
directly inflicted deaths, of population control. The working of Malthusian limits could 
have affected economic progress negatively, pushing living standards down; however 
greater population density could have lead to more advanced production techniques and 
modes of organization, in particular through the division of labour and increasing returns 
to scale.118 Moreover, even if the Malthusian trap had worked in the very long-run, in the 
shorter run there should have been long periods (such as after the Black Death) when 
population growth was compatible with some improvement in average living standards. 
Thus in the shorter run how wealth (land ownership in particular) was distributed could 
have made a great deal of difference for the well being of the bulk of the population. The 
pressure of population on resources could have been reduced by reducing the tendency to 
demographic growth, either by decreasing natality or by increasing mortality. Historically 
speaking the increase of mortality and reduction in life expectancy would first of all be 
based on infanticide, but also on high propensity to accidental death in later ages.  
8.1 The Malthusian mechanism under pre-agricultural conditions 
In particular looser or absent organized political power under pre-agricultural conditions 
could have made life more precarious and insecure, leading to higher adult mortality (which 
anyway would have been caused by such an hazardous endeavour as hunting with the 
available tools of the stone age), and lower pressure on resources, thus allowing higher 
living adult standards than in later more densely populated agricultural societies. This could 
be a reason explaining the apparent paradox of the alleged lower living standards in 
historical agricultural in relation to hunter-gatherers societies.119 In the latter people appear 
on average to be better fed and enjoy much more leisure. This can be easily explained if we 
consider that in principle in hunter gathering nomadic societies to hunt and collect more 
does not help to prevent starvation in hard times, since what is above necessities cannot be 
hoarded. The bottleneck to survival are the occasional times of scarcity, whenever the latter 
                                                 
118 In the development of agriculture this is stressed by Boserup (1965). 
119 On this see Ember (1978); Diamond (1987); Caldwell and Caldwell (2003). 
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do not occur there is no point in hunting and foraging more than what is needed for 
comfortable survival, taking into account the relation between possible yield and effort, 
where the former is reduced by the habit of sharing. At the same time, if less is foraged 
now, some more may be available in the future, especially if the foragers are able to reduce 
competition through defence of the territory against other groups. Another method to 
provide for the future as a kind of insurance (because of the expectation of reciprocating) 
is the practice of the sharing through gifts, probably enhanced by the fact that whenever a 
good hunt occurs the excess over current consumption cannot be stored, and what can be 
stored cannot be easily defended if it arises the envy of the lesser fortunate. In turn this in 
primitive societies may weaken the incentive to work,120 and at the same time may reduce 
the extent of the exploitation of natural resources, avoiding the “tragedy of the commons”. 
In agricultural societies it pays to labour all year along (even if with different intensity 
according to the seasons) in order to minimize the occurrence of starvation, since 
provisions and the increased productive capabilities of the earth as a consequence of 
improvements are carried on in time. So the harder and longer is labour the higher the 
probabilities of survival. In the end the numbers that a given territory can sustain are much 
higher with agriculture, but the living stiles are possibly less pleasant. The same kind of 
considerations could lead to a possible basic Malthusian mechanism for controlling hunter 
gatherers populations: the occurrence of the occasional lack of food bringing about 
starvation of a usually adequately fed population particularly subjected, because of the lack 
of carry-over, to the vagaries of environmental conditions.121 The greater the population 
density and the higher the pressure on resources, the higher the probability of occasional 
starvation to occur. In addition, a reason put forward for explaining the possibility of better 
living standards of hunters gatherers in relation to agriculturalists is the lower population 
pressure because of the more limited fertility of the former, associated with their specific 
life style, as well as the possible negative consequences on fertility of the increased mobility 
associated with situations of penury.122 During the Neolithic Demographic Transition, on 
the contrary. the apparent increase in fertility may be explained by the shift towards the 
sedentary life stile of agriculturalists from the previous nomadic pattern of hunters 
gatherers, and possibly by new opportunities for the earlier weaning of infants.123  
8.2 Hunters-Gatherers and the Zen Economy  
According to an austere vision of the pre-agricultural societies, hunters-gatherers were in a 
Zen economy,124 where, even if people were living in absolute poverty according to our 
metric, they were quite well off according to another, assumed Zen-like metric, where the 
defining condition is the abundance of leisure and the satisfaction of limited wants. 
Interestingly, this corresponds to the condition of foraging animals in the wild (see 
Winterhalder, 1993); in both cases life could be endowed with leisure but at the same time 
                                                 
120 Cf. Kaplan, 2000, p. 314. 
121 Cf. Kaplan, 2000, p. 311: “One of the perennial problems confronted by virtually all hunter-gatherers is 
not only the seasonal variation in resources, but more significantly the periodic failure of all major resources 
… Unlike agriculturalists, foragers appear to be unable or unwilling to store resources in the good times to 
tide them over the bad times.” 
122 Cf, Bocquet-Appel and Bahr-Yosef, 2008, p. 5. 
123 See Bocquet-Appel and Naji (2006). Of particular interest is the wide discussion of the whole issue, and of 
the specific findings of the authors, by other scholars at the end of the article.  
124 Sahlins, 1968, p. 85. 
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rather short and precarious. Aside from the issue of absolute poverty, in terms of relative 
poverty hunters-gatherers societies could have been on the whole relatively egalitarian, so 
that in terms of relative poverty they were rich. On the other hand not all the hunters-
gatherers societies were egalitarian, for instance there were complex ones where a 
hierarchical organization and even slavery were present (see Fitzhugh, 2003).  
The myth of the "original affluent society” and of the extent of its leisure, as well as of its 
pretended favourable living conditions seemed very suitable to the 1968 cultural 
environment where it was conceived. In more recent times a more sober reappraisal has 
been put forward. Kaplan (2000), in considering the living standards of one of the 
surviving foraging populations (the !Kung San of Southern Africa), sees rather strange to 
qualify as affluent “a society with a 50 percent childhood mortality rate and a life 
expectancy at birth of about thirty years”. Part of the confusion may derive from the 
apparent better alimentary and health conditions shown by the bones of pre-historical 
hunters gatherers in relation to those of pre-historical agriculturalists.125 The inference of a 
worsening of material conditions (at least as far as alimentation is concerned) with the 
passage to agriculture are translated into the atemporal idea of the “original affluent 
society”, echoing the myth of an ancient blissful state of nature. 
9. The take off from the Malthusian Trap, the Industrial Revolution, Socialism and 
Transition 
Thus for almost the totality of human history affluence has been a tiny exception in a sea 
of misery and precarious lives. Therefore the real historical singularity that must be 
explained is not poverty and backwardness, but development and wealth. If the issue of 
relative poverty and underdevelopment arises from the economic development of the 
countries that have become well off rather than from some countries having made worse 
off in an absolute sense, it is to the development of poorer countries that one should turn 
for getting rid of the issue, as well as for reducing, and one day perhaps eliminating, 
absolute poverty. In a number of countries, particularly in Asia, the take-off has succeeded, 
in others, particularly in Africa, seems to have failed. 
The gigantic increase in population and wealth in the last two centuries, and the very rapid 
(historically speaking) decrease in the proportion of the poor have been the outcome of a 
mode of production characterized by the systematic application of scientific principles, and 
the organized pursuit of scientific and technological progress, dramatically improving the 
living prospects of billions of men and women, as a consequence of the basic “idea of the 
world as open to transformation by human intervention.”126 According to conventional 
wisdom its ultimate sources may be found in the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, tied 
together by the Reformation’s critical discussion of traditional received faith. Until the 
Soviet Revolution this mode of production took the organizational form and vehicle of 
transmission of the internal and international capitalist market. This does not detract 
anything from the role performed by the state, in particular as provider of public goods and 
infrastructure, but the basic principle of economic functioning has been voluntary 
exchange. It is on voluntary exchange, and the creation and expansion of markets, as made 
possible by the creation of a mercantile economy and the gradual establishment of the rule 
of law and clear attribution of property rights, that the success of the Industrial Revolution 
                                                 
125 Cf. for instance Cohen, 1991. 
126 Giddens and Pierson, 1998, p. 94. 
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and its aftermath can be attributed. According to conventional wisdom in this lies the 
difference with other environments of the past (such as historical China or the Arab world 
at its apogee) where scientific progress and innovations did not translate into sustained 
economic and technological progress. Real socialism can be seen just as a specific variety of 
this mode of production whereby the fundamental aspects have been upheld through a sort 
of rough extension of the rational organizing principle to the whole of society, and 
accumulation and innovation have been organized from the centre rather than having been 
the outcome of the working of market forces. Eventually this daring experiment has 
encountered a bitter dead end, but in the process it has partaken both of the increase in 
population and of the increase in aggregate production. Its failure has been a comparative 
failure, but still its achievements in aggregate economic and life statistical terms may be 
seen as substantial in relation to pre-industrial epochs. If we are willing to indulge a little bit 
in counterfactuals, suppose that real socialism had prevailed throughout the world by way 
of revolution and/or military conquest, destroying the international market system in the 
process. It is conceivable that after the initial disruptive consequences of the change of 
system some process of increasing world wealth and population would have persisted 
anyway, at very least by way of capital accumulation and technological diffusion in the 
lesser developed areas. Of course there is the issue as to the extent the survival of Soviet 
type socialism has been helped in practice by the contemporary existence of an 
international capitalist economy, from which to draw technology, as well as goods (such as 
foodstuffs) for whose production Soviet-type socialism was utterly less proficient, and an 
international price system easing the difficult task of evaluating economic opportunities.127 
But let us abstract from the latter point. Would it have been enough to argue, after the 
suppression of capitalism, that no better system than the socialist one is possible and to 
ascribe to the very nature of real socialism the economic and demographic outcomes? In 
this respect two viewpoints seem to be equally objectionable: that a really existing, and 
therefore highly imperfect, system of production must be rejected because its performance 
is seen as defective, and another abstractly implementable system (socialism vs. capitalism) 
should do better; as well the opposite contention that no better system of organization (in 
our counterfactual example capitalism vs. Soviet-type socialism) is possible.128 A further 
consideration refers to the heavy cost of transition, as borne out by life statistical data. If 
compared with the case of China’s transition away from the Maoist system, this may 
exemplify the heavy toll of revolution as compared to evolution. Indeed transition in the 
former socialist camp has amounted to a, by and large pacific, but on the whole very 
disruptive, revolution led by institutional constructivism, the idea that everything can be 
explained by legal institutions, irrespective of the social and historical environment where 
these institutions are nested. One may also think in this respect of a second best theorem 
(as a consequence of institutional complementarity): whenever institutions from a superior 
environment (in the sense that on its whole it brings about superior results) are introduced 
                                                 
127 Soviet-type socialism appears to have been much less proficient than capitalism in the production of 
consumer goods in general and in particular in the innovation of better consumer goods and better ways to 
satisfy consumer needs. The only innovative consumer goods developed in the socialist camp that comes to 
my mind is Rubrik’s cube, developed in Hungary in the mid seventies. However Soviet type socialism was 
by all accounts no inferior to western capitalism in the production and development of military hardware. It 
was much less efficient and much more profligate in its utilization of energy resources and raw materials 
(see on this Gomulka and Rostowski, 1988). 
128 Following Demsetz (1969) economists dubb the first of the two views as Nirvana fallacy. 
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in an environment where the complementary institutions (which may well be of a tacit 
nature) are missing this can actually lead to a worsening, rather than to a betterment, of 
performance, until the complementary institutions are introduced, or a suitable adaptation 
of the overall institutional framework takes place. Of course the issue of the best strategy 
of transition is a complex and most debated one. A crucial factor constraining transition 
strategies was of course the fact that the economic and political system in the European ex-
communist countries was rotten from the inside, and its credibility and social support was 
low, rendering a path of gradual economic reform difficult to follow. 
10. Post-war development and the Malthusian trap 
As we have already mentioned, a most remarkable fact is that the world has never grown so 
fast, as to population and wealth, as in the post World War II period.129 We have 
considered the possible causes: globalization (in particular the great intensification of 
international trade and investment), technical progress (and the progress of medicine), 
originating in the European countries and Anglo-European offshoots; in particular 
progress in transportation and agriculture,130 and the absence of devastating conflicts at the 
global level (the world has been on the brink of a nuclear global disaster, but it didn’t fall 
into the precipice, yet). 
Notwithstanding the above successes, for the world as a whole the Malthusian trap is still 
lurking.131 But rather than decreasing agricultural returns, as in the classical explanation, it 
may be here relevant the pressure on scarce natural resources,132 and in particular the 
retroaction, on development and living standards, of the possible “tragedies of the 
commons”, including climate change.133 The industrial and demographic developments that 
have accompanied the present relative prosperity have taken place at the cost of world’s 
commons, in particular at the cost of the decumulation in the span of two hundred years of 
huge reserves of fossil fuels, the leftovers of hundreds of millions of years of life on 
earth.134 To this one may add the destruction of forests and pristine habitats, the pollution 
                                                 
129 This is epitomized by the title of Easterlin 1996 book: Growth Triumphant. 
130 The progresses in transportation and agriculture have bee of particular importance for the provision of the 
basic means of survival; thanks to those progresses Woodruff’s speculation in the sixties that “if we are to 
be guided simply by statistics, then in AD 2000—i. e. in the lifetime of our children—world population will 
have doubled and misery and starvation will stare mankind in the face” (op, cit,, p. 340) turned out to be 
correct only as far as population was concerned. For the remarkable performance of world agriculture in 
modern times, but especially in the post-second world war years, when agricultural output growth was 
exceeding the most exceptional growth of population, see Federico (2005, p. 19). For the role of agriculture 
spearheading, alongside industry, modern economic growth, see Easterlin, 1996, p.5. 
131 The extent to which the Malthusian trap is lurking is however controversial. For a contrary optimistic 
opinion see Simon (1981). According to Simon “another birth means another mind that can help think up 
ways of using resources more efficiently” (Lee, 2008). On the opposite side there is a vast intellectual 
current renewing the Malthusian tradition, such as by Garret Hardin, Albert A.Bartlett,  Paul Ehrlich, and 
the Club of Rome. 
132 Downplayed by Simon (1989), who optimistically sees in technological progress favoured by an increasing 
population the overall dominant factor. 
133 According to a plausible view, very specialized life stiles, such as in the contemporary world, increase 
population vulnerability to dramatic environmental changes; see Chu, 1998, pp. 193-194. 
134 In this perspective the long run survival and spreading to the rest of humanity of the high living standards 
of the most developed world crucially depend on the successful untapping of relatively clean and plentiful 
new sources of energy, such as nuclear energy, either in the development of its fission or even more, 
perhaps, in its elusive fusion form. 
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of air and water, and, last but not least, CO2 emissions. The plunder has mostly taken place 
to the advantage of industrialized countries, and of countries provided with large reserves 
of raw materials (in particular hydrocarbons), appropriating the rents of their exploitation. 
On the other hand the overall balance for poorer and energy poor countries cannot be 
considered as negative, since in the process their average living standards (considering both 
per capita income and life statistics) have greatly improved all the same, as a consequence 
of the diffusion of the technological advances of the West, notwithstanding the colonial 
domination to which most of them had been subjected in the past. But as more and more 
countries successfully pursue the type of industrialization and economic development that 
has made rich the West and better off the emerging economies, the pressure on resources 
and the enhanced generation of externalities may exert a negative feedback elsewhere, 
especially on the living standards of the countries deprived of natural resources, with 
potential destabilizing consequences on the economy and the peace of the world. 
Extrapolating historical experience, the way out the Malthusian trap could lie on the one 
hand in the enhancing of technological progress, and on the other in population 
containment, lessening the pressure on the resource base (including the world commons). 
Population containment could be the outcome of a voluntary process, either at the 
individual and family level, following the demographic pattern of reduction of natality 
accompanying the development of the presently more developed countries, or it may be 
favoured by public policy; the possible alternatives are the usual ones that have constrained 
the development of population in history. Once demographic developments are considered 
an object of policy, some delicate philosophical problems present themselves: Is it better in 
presence of limited resources to have many overlapping generations with short lives, or 
fewer generations with longer lives? How short or how long, and how many generations? 
How many  people for each generation? Many people with low living standards, or few 
with higher living standards? And how low or how high?135 In this respect one should be 
reminded of the old saying “more souls more joy”. Ceteris paribus, the larger the 
population the greater the number of possible originators of new ideas and discoveries, 
from which the progress of humanity (however conceived) ensues, and the greater the 
number of possible contacts and personal interactions, favouring the development of 
ideas.136 At the same time there may be some trade-off between quantity and quality: a 
smaller better educated population could be more conducive to economic and intellectual 
progress than a larger uneducated one living at the margin of survival. Theoretically 
speaking we could also have a Simonian dynamic equilibrium whereby high population 
growth spurs fast technological progress, the latter higher per capita incomes, which would 
retroact in maintaining the momentum of technical progress and of demographic and 
economic growth, compensating Malthusian static decreasing returns.137 
                                                 
135 These dilemmas can be seen as brought to their extreme consequences in Asimov’s utopian world of the 
Foundation series (cf. in particular Asimov, 1986): As an alternative model to the crammed world of Trantor, 
the capital of the Galactic Empire, where 40 billion humans live in artificial domes, we have the very 
sparsely populated Solaria, where the population is controlled by strict demographic planning, with few 
(mutated) humans living very comfortably in very large estates worked by armies of robots. 
136 Cf. Simon (1981). 
137 On the relation between population growth, technical progress, and per capita incomes see Kremer (1993). 
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11 The limits to population growth: natality, mortality, and catastrophes 
It is obvious however that a demographic explosion such as that of the last decades cannot 
last forever. Carlo Cipolla (1974 [1962], p. 86) quotes “an exercise in astronomical 
arithmetics” by C.P. Putnam (the inventor of the first windmill generation turbine), 
according to which “if the [human] race had sprung from a couple living not long before 
agriculture was discovered—let us say 10,000 B.C.—and if its members had expanded at 
the rate of one per cent per year since then [which is lower than the present rate of growth 
of world population], the world population would form today a sphere of living flesh many 
thousand light years in diameter, and expanding with a radial velocity that, neglecting 
relativity, would be many times faster than light.”138 
A correction to the process of world overpopulation could be found in a decreasing birth 
rate, as a by-product of per capita income growth, and in the extension of social security 
systems into the countries where the survival of the elderly is otherwise dependent on 
family ties, as well as in the improvement and diffusion of the technology of birth control. 
Thus, according to Easterlin (1996), p. 112, “both theory and evidence indicate that the 
population explosion is a transient phase of contemporary development experience”, since 
in developing countries “the more rapid the Mortality Revolution, the more rapid is the 
transition to lower fertility”, replicating, albeit with different speed and modalities, the 
demographic transition of present developed countries. But can one really discount the 
possibility that the Mortality Revolution could intensify as a consequence of further 
medical discoveries after the transition to lower fertility is over, or that preferences 
regarding procreation could differ as a consequence of different cultural traditions in 
developing countries, or could change even in the developed world, altering the dynamic 
demographic balance? Preferences and technology cannot really be considered as given in 
the long-run. The forecast of a levelling out of world population around 2050 at something 
more than 9 billion is at most a reasonable extrapolation of present trends, but of course 
only those who will be there at the time will be able to judge whether the it is an adequate 
prediction of the future. 
The shape of a future long-run population equilibrium, absent a sudden demographic 
catastrophe, could entail a low mortality rate, a low birth rate, a long life span, and a 
marked increase in the average population age. Perhaps a senescent population will be less 
dynamic but wiser, and more endowed with experience.139 While we can think of 
demographic policies affecting the size of a population at the country level (even if a 
country could represent an important chunk of the world population, such as China), it 
seems hardly possible that demographic policies could be devised and implemented at the 
world level (such as advocated notably by Julian Huxley140) in order to take into account 
                                                 
138 A more recent statement in this line, by Albert A. Bartlett, is that “the greatest shortcoming of the human 
race is our inability to understand the exponential function” http://www.albartlett.org/. 
139 On the quality advantages of a more aged labour force see Easterlin, 1996, p. 124. For the economic 
consequences of population aging see ibidem, pp. 113, f. 
140 Cf. Julian Huxley (1964). Huxley is rather vague however on the instruments. Apparently the main 
instrument of population control that he envisages is the diffusion and promotion of the technology of 
birth control (p. 248: “When I say a population policy, I don’t mean that anybody is going to tell how many 
children she may have… It means that you recognize population as major problem of national life, that you 
have a general aim in regard to it, and that you try to devise methods for realizing this aim. And if you have 
an international population policy, again it doesn’t mean dictating to backward countries or anything of that 
sort; it means not depriving them of the right … to scientific information on birth-control, and it means 
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the important externalities that individual decisions regarding procreation have for the 
world as a whole.141 In the past demographic control, contrasting the operation of the 
Malthusian trap, was often ensured by custom, involving habits such as organized celibacy 
(as in monastic orders), repression of sexuality, and late marriages (the way out praised by 
Malthus himself), systematic infanticide, or belligerent habits leading to an increase of adult 
mortality.142 Under conditions of progressively increasing life expectancy demographic 
control could assume the form of some limitation to the length of life, if not explicitly and 
legally binding as in the dystopian world of the 10-th Victim,143 in the more subtle form of 
denying life supporting medical treatment and, possibly, the economic means of survival, to 
the elderly. 
Of the three factors that have historically contributed to held populations in check through 
recurrent catastrophes: epidemic diseases, famines, and war, the impact of epidemic 
diseases has been greatly reduced by the progresses of medicine, and even the definitive 
cure or prevention through vaccination of the AIDS epidemics appears only question of 
time. Of course the possibility of the surfacing of some new epidemic disease, such as 
aviary influenza, is always possible, but only with temporarily limited consequences, until, 
presumably, medical research comes to grip with it. Mass starvation as a consequence of 
famine has been largely swept away by progresses in transportation and agricultural 
technique, with the possible exception of countries plagued by war and heavy internal 
disturbances. Even if at the moment tensions are re-surfacing on the international food 
market, following increased demand and the ill-advised subsidization of fuel producing 
crops, another agricultural revolution is in progress through the development of OGMs, 
which, notwithstanding misgivings and preconceived hostilities, seems essentially a 
foregone development. The impact of the new revolution appears more far-reaching and of 
potentially much greater impact than the previous one, because of the much faster process 
of scientific plant breeding, and the much greater potential of invention of new varieties 
suitable for the most various environmental conditions.144 However, alike the Green 
Revolution, and even more than the latter, the OGMs revolution also presents problems of 
compatibility with the various natural and institutional environments, especially in less 
developed countries. Obstacles to its spreading are presented by the specific nature of its 
associated private property rights, and consequent hindrances to imitation of privately 
owned know-how.145 The latter aspect could be partly overcome through internationally 
concerted public action, involving in particular public, instead of private, funding of 
research. Moreover public international funding could provide an opportunity to direct 
research in areas which, while privately unprofitable, may contribute to stave off 
humanitarian crises, and help development, of poorer countries subject to environmental 
degradation. All in all the potentially most destructive factor, besides some sudden 
environmental disaster, could eventually be war, as a consequence of the spreading of 
                                                                                                                                               
help in regulating and controlling their increase and planning their families.”) Fictionally, there is far-
reaching demographic planning in Julian’s brother’s Aldous Huxley dystopian novel Brave New World (1932). 
141 A rather provocative and thought provoking discussion of the externalities generated by individual 
population decisions and the (un)suitability of a deliberate public policy aimed at affecting them is Friedman 
(1972). 
142 For an account of various methods of population control in different historical and anthropological 
settings, see Caldwell and Caldwell (2003). 
143 Petri (1965). 
144 See Cuffaro, 2001, p. 139 
145 Ibidem, pp. 136-144. 
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atomic technology and of international tensions building up in an increasingly overcrowded 
and progressively shrinking world.146  
12. War, peace, the Bomb, and their economic consequences 
12.1 The economic consequences of war and peace in historical perspective 
The game humanity played in the past, when conquest, plunder, territorial expansion and 
domination, slavery, torture and mass killings were respectable endeavours and part of the 
rules of the game, and mass murderers acquired the status of national heroes, still 
remembered and glorified in monuments and history books, has led on the whole to very 
poor results, as measured at least in terms of demographic and economic growth. However 
the real extent to which wars were contributing to hold in check the progress of humanity 
is difficult to gauge. 147 A strict Malthusian could object that living standards and 
population would have been held in check by other Malthusian factors anyway. On the 
other hand as an instrument of population control war was particularly wasteful. It 
produced destruction both of human (in particular of adult males in their productive prime, 
while mortality from disease or starvation affects first of all the children and the elderly) 
and of physical capital. It required huge resources that could be alternatively used for 
collective surplus creation (which could also be employed for productivity enhancement: 
for instance irrigation works) or for demographic enlargement. The latter could lead to 
economic progress, in a Boserupian perspective, or through the cultural mechanisms 
argued by Julian Simon. Personal trade interrelations and useful personal contacts between 
the belligerents are also disrupted by war, with negative consequences on the economic 
base and demographic sustainability of the parties concerned. According to the socio-
Darwinian vision, war is seen historically as an engine of natural selection of peoples and 
civilizations towards the progress of humanity;148 but the selection provided by war has 
tended to bring to the fore populations and civilizations notable for their destructive and 
coercive power rather than for their peaceful civilized achievements. At the same time 
peaceful achievements could be to some extent dependent on the ability to organize and 
exert some degree of coercive power: a relatively complex societal organization, such some 
ancient or modern empires, could be apt both to successfully wage wars and to peaceful 
and progressive purposes, as relative to the times. But this does not apply, for instance, to 
the fierce primitive hordes plundering and destroying ancient civilizations and complexly 
organized states. Here too the picture could change, once the hordes are settled and 
organize an empire on a territory that may profit of the relative stability provided by the 
rulers (such as in the case of the Pax Mongolica), at least until the next invasions, massacres 
and destruction, in an endless Penelopian weaving and destroying the thread of civilization. 
Whatever the reasons, until recent times the progress of humanity, both in terms of 
                                                 
146 It is well known that overcrowding is a factor of aggressiveness in animal populations. Some tendencies of 
this sort could apply to human populations as well, especially if overcrowding leads to tension building 
processes such as massive migration flows and increasing pressure on natural resources. That demographic 
growth could lead to international tensions and open conflicts for getting control of natural resources is 
denied by Simon (1989). His arguments, pointing to induced technical progress especially in agriculture, are 
not really persuasive though, because he is simply assuming, extrapolating the past, the offsetting impact of 
induced technical progress in the future. 
147 For a quantitative assessment of the negative impact of war on growth in modern times, see Milanovic 
(2005).  
148 Cf. Mueller, 2009, p. 7. 
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population and of productive achievements, has been so slow as to amount, in our present 
perception of time, to stagnation, with long spans of regression.149 The first millennium of 
the vulgar era was for Europe a lost millennium: the decadence and fall of the Roman 
Empire and the dislocations following the barbaric invasions left Europe worse off 
economically in the year 1000, at the dawn of the new Christian nations, than at the time of 
the birth of Jesus Christ. Real sustained progress, meaning a substantial overcoming of the 
Malthusian trap (or anyway, whatever the interpretation, of the near long run stagnation, 
according to our modern perspective, in world population and economy), had to wait until 
the Industrial Revolution gradually spread all over the world. But it has been the peace 
period after the Second World War (localized conflicts notwithstanding) that has been 
accompanied by the greatest acceleration in the speed of demographic and economic 
advance the world has ever known in its history.  
Following the tragedy of two world wars the international community refuses the 
legitimacy of wars of aggression directed to the enlargement of national borders and the 
acquisition of new territories, which in the past were one of the most popular endeavours 
of nations and rulers and, if successful, were a source of glory and pride.150 In the post-war 
period, in comparison with previous times, expansionary wars have been on the whole very 
limited, and mostly restricted to less developed countries, in most cases have been 
unsuccessful, a moderating factor having been the pressure exerted by the international 
community.151  
12.1.1 The rationality of war 
In the past a war of conquest had some rationality (as in the present world it could appear 
to someone a war for controlling territories endowed with natural resources, such as 
hydrocarbons, or having a strategic location for their transport and control) since the 
natural productive foundations on which to re-start a growth process were largely 
unaffected by catastrophic events, as the foundation of wealth and survival was 
agriculture.152 Moreover in ancient times plunder and enslavement of the conquered could 
provide further reasonable motivations (obviously looking just at the economic viewpoint). 
                                                 
149 An exception could have occurred during the Neolithic Demographic Transition when, according to 
some, population growth rates of 1% and more could have taken place for a sustained span of time (see 
Gary Warrick’s comment in Bocquet-Appel and Najit, 2006, p. 355; Bellwood, Peter and Marc Oxenham, 
2008, p. 22). With no improvement of living standards, however: as we have already mentioned the 
common opinion is that actually living standard were lower than under the previous pre-agricultural 
societies, because of longer work hours, less satisfactory nutrition, greater morbidity as a consequence of 
higher population density. 
150 Waging a war of aggression, in particular, has been made an international crime in the charter of the 
United Nations (art. 39). It is not particularly tranquillizing however that this provision had a precedent in 
article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations but this, as well as the Kellog-Briand pact of 1928 
outlawing wars of aggression, did not prevent Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union (both signatories of the 
pact) attacking Poland in September 1939, thus triggering the Second World War. 
151 Cf. Zacher (2001). For a detailed list of post-War II military events and of their territorial consequences 
see the table 2, “Interstate territorial aggressions, 1946–2000” (ibidem, pp. 225-228). 
152 On this point see Simon (1989, pp. 170-171). This in the end was coherent with the German Lebensraum  
concept, which paradoxically came to prominence in a period in which agriculture was reducing its relative 
importance in favour of industry, but which also encompassed the advantageous procurement through 
territorial expansion, in the mindset of the autarchic economy, of primary resources useful for industrial 
and military purposes. Moreover under autarchy territorial expansion could be seen as a means of market 
expansion, a costly replacement to free international trade. 
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People and land were the foundations of the power of states, of the capability to defend 
(and to enlarge) themselves and of the extent of their surplus extraction.153 Things appear 
differently with the drastic change in the economic basis and the advances in military 
technology. The prosperity of industrial and post-industrial countries relies on very delicate 
social and economic mechanisms, and a much greater surplus may be enjoyed through 
voluntary exchange than through conquest and enslavement (even disregarding the costs of 
achieving the latter). This was the point raised by Angell (1913) on the eve of the First 
World War, declaring its impossibility on rational economic considerations.154 Eventually, 
the “impossible” war broke out, with catastrophic economic (not to speak of the non-
economic) consequences for everybody concerned, putting a halt to the successful 
economic progress of the “belle époque”. War is indeed an eminently destructive 
endeavour, not always avoidable on the basis of strictly rational considerations. Moreover 
“not the facts, but men’s belief about facts, shapes their conduct”.155 And rational 
economic considerations may not be really important in waging a war: “In sum, studies of 
both the direct and the indirect influence of economic factors on the causation of war 
indicate that they have been much less important than political ambitions, ideological 
convictions, technological change, legal claims, irrational psychological complexes, 
ignorance, and unwillingness to maintain conditions of peace in a changing world”156. Once 
                                                 
153 On this see Gilpin pp. 111-112. 170.  
154 “It is impossible for one nation to seize by force the wealth or trade of another -- to enrich itself by 
subjugating, or imposing its will by force on another” (Angell, 1913, p. ix). Along the same lines see also 
Simon (1989) and Gilpin (1981, pp. 132-133): “through specialisation and international trade an efficient 
state can gain more than through territorial expansion and conquests”. For a recent contrary view see 
Liberman, 1996. Liberman, drawing on a survey of historical cases argues that “ruthless invaders can, in 
fact, successfully exploit industrial societies, as least for short periods of time.” But “the balance sheets 
evalutated [in his book] do not consider the costs of military conquest or economic sanctions imposed by 
states outside the empire…Mainly because other states balance against aggressors, conquest usually leads to 
disaster”(p. 4). Moreover successful exploitation requires ruthless coercion and repression (p. 5). On 
balance, it seems quite likely that the economic benefit of free trade may be highly superior to the economic 
benefits of successful military conquest, even if the latter is accompanied by ruthless exploitation (in this 
may lie the often assumed tendency of free trade to lead to peace, while the latter instead could be 
jeopardized by trade barriers, which could give some justification to the merging of market through imperial 
conquest; see on this Liberman, 1996, p. 30, and the literature quoted there). But this is particularly true of 
our modern times when technological progress is particularly fast and the modern fabric of society 
particularly complex. One thing is to exert outside repressive control over mass production in large 
factories organized along tayloristic principles (such as it may have been in the historical cases considered  
by Liberman) under unchanging or slowly changing technology, another in the framework of modern post-
industrial economies based on information technology and on sophisticated management of production and 
innovation, where about three quarters of National Income rely on the production of services in a context 
of rapid technological progress. The latter could be greatly hampered anyway by the kind of exploitative 
organization that Liberman is considering. It should be noted that the Liberman’s argument in support of 
the historical profitability of conquest is ambiguous. It refers rather to the “cumulativity” of the resources 
of the conquered to be used for the military power of the conquerors rather than for the economic welfare 
of the latter. Conquest, according to Liberman, could enhance military power through exploitation of the 
resources of the conquered by the conqueror government towards warlike endeavours favoured by making 
those resources available to the state. But trade may instead increase economic welfare, without its benefits 
being amenable to centralized control, especially if the opportunity for trade could be progressively 
enhanced by technological progress and increased productivity, while economic development, and so the 
growth of potential surplus, could be hampered by exploitative dominance. Thus exploitative dominance 
could have some attraction for authoritarian states, much less for democracies.  
155 Angell, 1913, p. ix. 
156 Wright (1968, p. 463), quoted in Simon (1989, p. 5). 
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Keynes wrote that practical men are usually the slaves of some defunct economists.157 We 
could extend the concept to international politics and war: peoples are captive of the ideas 
and the examples, recounted and celebrated by historians, of ancient conquerors and 
warlike peoples, notwithstanding the change in the economic and political circumstances 
that should rationally lead to different modes of behaviour.158 In this respect history, far 
from being magistra vitae, should be considered a time-bomb, to be handled with the utmost 
care. 
12.2 The economic consequences of the Bomb159 
The economic argument against war becomes much more compelling with nuclear 
technology. The spreading of nuclear armaments brings about a reduction in the propensity 
towards armed regional conflicts. After India and Pakistan had acquired nuclear status 
there have been moments of acute tension, but, unlike in the past, none of these tensions 
has led to open war, but for the localized Kargil conflict on the Indian side of the Kashmir 
line of control in 1999, where the possession of nuclear weapons may have contributed to 
keep the conflict localized and to lead eventually to the withdraw of Pakistani forces.160 
Since it has become a nuclear power, Arab countries have ceased to wage open war to 
Israel, with the exception of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, when the Israel presumed atomic 
capability may have weighted heavily on the extent of American support for Israel,161 and 
on the restricted aims of the Syrian-Egyptian offensive.162 Open direct conflicts between 
nuclear powers have been very rare and localized, such as the Kargil conflict mentioned 
above, and the Soviet-Chinese Ussuri conflict in 1969. At the same time, in case of 
escalation of hostilities towards a global conflict between atomic powers, the consequences 
could be disastrous, and not only for the countries concerned. The nuclear deterrent could 
be used, instead than for maintaining a cold peace, as a safeguard against escalating a 
conventional conflict in a nuclear war. But waging a conventional war against another 
nuclear power under the deterrence of a nuclear umbrella, being confident that it will not 
escalate in a nuclear conflict could be a very dangerous game.  
                                                 
157 “Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the 
slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their 
frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back” (Keynes, 1936, p. 383).  
158 This may be seen to apply to the case of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the ensuing wars, or, more 
recently, to the renewed imperial ambitions of Putin’s post-Soviet Russia. But history presents innumerable 
cases where the conscience of the heritage of the past brought about present blunders and destruction. A 
textbook case, not too far away in time, is the Italian Fascists’ grotesque striving to revive the past glories of 
the Roman empire. 
159 For a survey of the debate on the consequences of the Bomb for international relations see Roth, 2007. 
160 CSIS, 1999. 
161 Cf. Farr, 1999, and the literature quoted by him. 
162 “Arab strategies and war aims in 1967 may have been restricted because of a fear of the Israeli ‘bomb in 
the basement,’ the undeclared nuclear option. The Egyptians planned to capture an eastern strip next to the 
Suez Canal and then hold. The Syrians did not aggressively commit more forces to battle or attempt to 
drive through the 1948 Jordan River border to the Israeli center. Both countries seemed not to violate Israel 
proper and avoided triggering one of the unstated Israeli reasons to employ nuclear weapons” (Ibidem). 
Even if the possession by Israel of a viable battle-ready nuclear capability was uncertain (see Roth, 2007, p. 
379), the mere possibility could have been enough to restrict the scope of the attack, even if not the attack 
itself. 
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In the present world the victory in a nuclear war could be a Pyrrhic one, since the 
conquered territories would stay contaminated and unproductive, 163 and the wealth of the 
defeated would be destroyed with their physical destruction, not to speak of the losses of 
the victor. Until now this entirely rational consideration (as well as the fear for the 
enormous losses of a nuclear war) has prevented all out wars between nuclear powers. But 
some kind of miscalculation as to the opponent’s response could precipitate a nuclear 
conflict. And unfortunately hate, which may be totally destructive, can provide a stronger 
motivation than greed. Indeed, the object of hate is in damaging or destroying the other, 
while greed amounts to benefiting oneself irrespective of the welfare of the others, but it 
does not necessarily imply their destruction. Sometimes it may even imply caring for their 
welfare, if their survival or collaboration is to the advantage of the greedy. In this respect 
we can add hate to the perspective of Simon (1989, p. 179), according to whom “Ironically, 
all haters of war should pray that humans are very materialistic in their motives, as 
compared to their devotion to their religious or cultural heritage, or even to aesthetic 
values, because sound calculation of the economic benefit-cost ratio of war would result in 
the decision not to begin a war.” Historically, intrinsic favourable attitudes towards war and 
against peace as such were also widespread, based on war being the occasion for displaying 
moral virtues and for performing heroic deeds, authoritatively represented, among others, 
in the works of prominent philosophers, from Aristotle to Kant (before writing Zum Ewigen 
Frieden), to Nietzsche (see Mueller, 2009, p. 2). In a sense war was in the past world the 
most preferred sport for engaging the physical contest of communities and nations, before 
the invention and world diffusion of football.  
12.3 The balance of power and the poison pills of the weak 
The return to the old days when the balance of power was ensuring a precarious 
equilibrium between “conservative” and “revisionist” powers, such as seemingly aimed for 
presently by Russia, striving to build up a security alliance with China against the West, 
would entail enormous dangers: an international equilibrium based on the balance of 
power, rather than on basic commonly shared values (such as in the “pluralistic security 
community” of the West to which Russia could have become part if not for the drive 
towards authoritarian nationalism, or, in its words, “sovereign democracy”), may lead to 
war whenever the balance is altered, or is seen in the process of being altered.164 Moreover, 
the future may bring about the impossibility of having a balance of military power because 
of the net economic and military dominance of some large and assertive, potentially 
“revisionist”, and expansionist, actors, such as could be the case in future with China165. 
                                                 
163 But the above does not apply to the neutron bomb! 
164 A clear-cut example of the extreme dangers of a perceived process of alteration of the overall strategic 
balance between nuclear powers is provided to the Cuban missile crisis, which brought the world very close 
to a global nuclear catastrophe. 
165 China’s status as a dominant power seems inevitable if the actual pace of its economic and military growth 
is maintained. Its nationalistic-revisionist bias, as revealed by the obsession of annexing Taiwan (since the 
takeover by the Communists of continental China a de facto independent country that belonged to the 
Chinese empire until 1895, and then a Japanese colony until 1945) by force if necessary, and the scramble 
for the contested partition of the oil resources of the China sea, could make its dominance a danger for 
world peace. According to past experience any time new international actors raise forcefully to the scene of 
international politics following successful economic growth, some violent adjustments of the power 
relations are on the agenda (cf. Easterlin, 1996, p. 6). But, optimistically, one could also envisage an 
alternative path, leading China to become part of a “world security community, a group among whom war 
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Poison pills by weaker powers, such as the potential of derailing a conventional war into a 
nuclear war, with terrible consequences for the stronger aggressor, even in case the weaker 
is defeated (what it may be called the “Samson strategy”), could in the future restrain 
military aggression, albeit not some kind of suicidal attacks by those motivated by hate and 
unrestrained by the prospects of their own destruction. But also stronger powers could be 
tricked in gambling from their position of strength, and their delusion could bring about 
untold consequences on economic and demographic progress. 
13. Conclusion 
Our generation has had the privilege of living in a very special period in the history of 
mankind. Never in history have material conditions progressed at the rate to which we 
have become used to in the post-war years, never have the different parts of the globe and 
the different populations become so close, and world population increased at a faster rate. 
Never have overall life statistics improved in such a substantial way. Still, an important part 
of humanity lives precarious lives under appalling conditions of absolute poverty, but its 
relative share, and in more recent times even its absolute numbers, have steadily decreased. 
In the continuation, and possibly the intensification, of this process may lie the hope to 
eventually overcome world poverty (at least in absolute terms). At the basis of those 
achievements there has been a system of production and of organization (whatever its 
specific variations in the different countries and the different times) that has put to the fore 
the systematic pursuit of technical progress, and its utilization in all aspects of economic 
life, while providing the drive and the incentives to do so. A contributing factor 
accompanying the greatest increase of population and living standards that the world has 
historically known has been the intensification and acceleration of world economic and 
non-economic exchanges (“globalization”). In a world characterized by “capitalist peace” 
and by the refusal of the autarchic tendencies of a recent past, when autarchy was preparing 
the ground to a disastrous war, any country takes advantage of other countries through 
mutually beneficial voluntary exchanges rather than looking forward to take advantage 
through conquest and exploitation. No alternative better foundation of international 
economic relations has to date been credibly proposed. But this same system has also 
brought about the utilization of technical progress for making increasingly more destructive 
the technology of warfare. For the first time in history mankind has produced the military 
technology that has the potential to lead to its own demise. The danger of global 
thermonuclear warfare has kept the world by and large at relative peace for more than sixty 
years, quite an unprecedented achievement that has presumably very much contributed to 
the overall positive results. But even if the danger appears to have decreased with the end 
of the Cold War, the potential for large scale destruction remains, and may increase with 
the spreading of nuclear technology in presence of persisting or even increasing 
nationalistic drives, such as by resurging old imperial powers. Traditional power politics 
and dangerous brinkmanship may resurface again. Sooner or later we may go back to 
normality, with nationalism breeding imperialism and wars of aggression, but with much 
enhanced capabilities for destruction. Large scale nuclear warfare is always a possibility, 
                                                                                                                                               
is literally unthinkable” (Jervis, 2002, p. 1).  The signals that China directs to the outside world are mixed. 
On the one hand there is the diplomatic approach of “China’s peaceful rise” aiming to create good 
neighbouring relations with the other South-East Asian countries, aiming to the creation of a 
comprehensive Free Trade Area, on the other there is the disquieting growth of its military might, whereby 
military expenditures grow at double digit since the nineties. (See Jamestown Foundation, 2009.) 
 - 48 -
especially with the inevitable proliferation of nuclear capabilities, with enormous risks for 
the survival of humanity, even short of Dr. Strangelove’s Doomsday Machine. As always 
has been the case in history, prosperity and economic progress are by no means foregone 
conclusions.  
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX: LIFE STATISTICS 
Table 1A166 Yearly births per 100 population 
 1820 1900 1950 1999 2007 
Italy 3.9 3.3 1.94  0.93 0.85 
West European Average 3.74 3.08 1.83 1 1(EU) 
East European Average     0.99167 
United States 5.52 3.23 2.4 1.44 1.42 
Japan 2.62 3.24 2.81 0.95 0.81 
Russia 4.13 4.8 2.65 0.88 1.09 
Latin American Average   4.19 2.51  
China  4.12 3.7 1.6 1.75 
India  4.58 4.5 2.8 2.27 
Asian Average (without Japan)   4.28 2.3  
African Average   4.92 3.9 3.8 
World   3.74 2.3 2.02 
 
Table 2A. Average Life Expectancy for Groups A and B, 1000–1999168 (years at birth; average for both sexes) 
 1000  1820  1900  1950  1999 
Group A  24  36  46  66  78 
Group B  24  24  26  44  64 
World  24  26  31  49  66 
 
                                                 
166 Source: Maddison, p. 32 (some of the values refer to slightly different years: see the notes in the source); 
for the year 2007: CIA (2007), and, for the African average, PRB (2007). The data reported in the World 
Factbook for 2007 range from 0.73 (Hong-Kong) to 5.0. It is notable that among the 223 countries 
whose data are reported, 9 of the first 10 positions belong to African countries.  
167 Simple average of 17 East-European countries, with values ranging from 8.8 (Bosnia) to 1.2 
(Macedonia). 
168 Source: Maddison, p. 33. Group A: Western Europe, Western Offshoots (USA, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand), and Japan, Group B is the rest of the world. 
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Table 3A.169 Life expectancy at birth 
 1820 1900 1950 2007 
Italy 30 43 66 79.9 
Western Europe 36 46 67 79.5 
Eastern Europe    74.5 
Russia 28 32 65 65.9 
United States 39 47 68 78 
Japan 34 44 61 82 
Latin America 27 35 51 72.8 
China na 24 41 72,9 
India 21 24 32 68.6 
Asia 23 24 40 69 
Africa 23 24 38 52,2 
World 26 31 49 65.8 
More developed 
countries 
   76.7 
Less developed 
countries 
   64.6 
Sources: Maddison, 2006, p. 32; for 2007 U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base, at http://www.census.gov/cgi-
bin/ipc/idbagg. 
                                                 
169 In order to understand the implication of the data one should consider that the data concerning life 
expectancy are affected for pre-modern and modern backward societies by very high child mortality 
rates, while adult life expectancy can be much higher. For instance in a demographic regime such as in 
the Mopti district of Mali in 1957-58 with a total fertility rate (average number of live birth per woman) 
of 7.5, life expectancy was 18, but life expectancy at 20 was 48, while in another one, corresponding 
more or less to the demographic regime of 1650-1750 England, with fertility rate 4 life expectancy was 
33, but life expectancy at 20 was 55 (Caldwell and Caldwell, 2003, p.  210). 
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 Table 4A. Some life statistics from WHO, year 2005170 
 
Life 
expectancy 
at birth 
Healthy life 
expectancy 
at birth 
Adult 
mortality 
rate171 
Under 5 
mortality 
rate172 
Infant 
mortality 
rate173 
Neonatal 
mortality 
rate174 
Maternal 
mortality 
rate175 
 male female male female male female     
Italy 78 84 71 75 89 46 4 4 3 5 
USA 75 80 67 71 137 81 8 7 4 14 
Japan 79 86 72 78 92 45 4 3 1 10 
Russia 59 72 53 64 470 173 14 11 7 65 
India 62 64 53 54 280 207 74 56 39 540 
Brazil 68 75 57 62 225 118 33 28 13 260 
China 71 74 63 65 155 98 27 23 18 56 
South-
East 
Asian 
Region 
62 65 54 55 272 207 68 51 35 460 
African 
Region 
48 50 40 42 480 438 165 99 40 910 
World 64 68 56 59 233 164 74 51 28 400 
European 
Union176 
76 82      5   
Some interesting extreme values (giving the existing range), from CIA Factbook (2007): Birth rate 
(births/1000) 50 (Niger)--7,34 (Hong-Kong); death rate (deaths/1000): 30.35 (Swaziland177)--2.16 (United 
Arab Emirates); Infant Mortality Rate: 184.84 (Angola)--2.3 (Singapore); Life Expectancy at Birth: 83.52 
(Andorra)--32.23 (Swaziland); Total Fertility Rate (children born/woman): 7.38 (Mali)---0.98 (Hong-Kong) 
(1.50 EU). 
 
                                                 
170 WHO, 2007. For a definition of the different indicators and the methods used in their assessment, see 
WHO, National Burden of Disease Studies:A Practical Guide. Geneva; WHO, 2001. 
171 Probability of dying aged 15–60 years per 1000 population. 
172 Probability of dying aged < 5 years per 1000 live births. 
173 Per 1 000 live births. Mortality in the first year of life. 
174  Per 1 000 live births. Mortality in the first 28 days of life. 
175 Per 100,000 live births. 
176 From CIA (2007). 
177 In the case of Swaziland the very high mortality rate and the the very low life expectancy can be related 
to a HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate of nearly 40% (cf. CIA Factbook , 2007).. 
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Table 5A. Some life statistics of Eastern Europe from WHO, year 2005178 
 
Life 
expectancy at 
birth 
Healthy life 
expectancy at 
birth 
Adult 
mortality 
rate179 
Under 5 
mortality 
rate180 
Infant 
mortality 
rate181 
Neonatal 
mortality 
rate182 
Maternal 
mortality 
rate183 
 male female male female male female     
Albania 69 73 59 63 167 98 18 16 9 55 
Belarus 63 75 57 65 366 133 9 7 3 36 
Bosnia 70 77 62 66 186 88 15 13 10 31 
Bulgaria 69 76 63 67 213 92 15 12 7 32 
Croatia 72 79 64 69 166 65 7 6 5 10 
Czech Rep 73 79 66 71 156 70 4 3 2 9 
Estonia 67 78 59 69 281 100 7 6 4 38 
Hungary 69 77 62 68 256 107 8 6 5 11 
Latvia 65 76 58 68 314 114 10 8 6 61 
Lithuania 65 77 59 68 326 109 9 7 5 19 
Poland184 71 79 63 68 208 79 8 6 5 10 
Romania 68 76 61 65 230 102 19 16 10 58 
Russia 59 72 53 64 470 173 14 11 7 65 
Serbia 70 75 … … 192 98 9 8 … … 
Slovakia 70 78 63 69 201 77 9 7 4 10 
Slovenia 74 81 67 72 152 67 4 3 2 17 
Ukraine 61 73 55 64 403 150 17 13 7 38 
 
                                                 
178 World Health Statistics, WHO, 2007. For a definition of the different indicators and the methods used in 
their assessment, see WHO, 2001. 
179 Probability of dying aged 15–60 years per 1000 population. 
180 Probability of dying aged < 5 years per 1000 live births. 
181 Per 1 000 live births. Mortality in the first year of life. 
182  Per 1 000 live births. Mortality in the first 28 days of life. 
183 Per 100,000 live births. 
184 From CIA (2007). 
